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This paper exploits temporal and spatial variation in the implementation of nine city- and four state-
level U.S. sick pay mandates to assess their labor market consequences. We use the synthetic control
group method and traditional difference-in-differences models along with the Quarterly Census of
Employment and Wages to estimate the causal effects of mandated sick pay on employment and
wages. We do not find much evidence that employment or wages were significantly affected by the
mandates that typically allow employees to earn one hour of paid sick leave per work week, up to
seven days per year. Employment decreases of 2 percent lie outside the 92 percent confidence interval
and wage decreases of 3 percent lie outside the 95 percent confidence interval.
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1 Introduction
Paid sick leave was an integral part of the first social insurance scheme in the world. The Sickness
Insurance Law of 1883 implemented federally mandated employer-provided health insurance in 
Germany, which covered up to 13 weeks of paid sick leave along with medical care. Insurance against
wage losses due to health shocks was a crucial element of health insurance at that time, and valued by
employees and unions alike. Given the limited availability of expensive medical treatments in the 19th
century, expenditures for paid sick leave initially accounted for more than half of all health insurance ex-
penditures (Busse and Riesberg, 2004). Other European countries followed soon and also implemented
paid sick leave. Today, virtually every European country provides universal access to paid sick leave.
The United States, Canada, and Japan are the only industrialized countries that do not provide uni-
versal access to paid sick leave. In these countries, sick pay is largely provided as a fringe benefit by
employers on a voluntary basis (Heymann et al., 2009). In the United States, coverage rates are around
65 percent among full-time workers; low-income, part-time, and service sector workers have coverage
rates of less than 20 percent (Lovell, 2003; Boots et al., 2009; Susser and Ziebarth, 2016). Susser and
Ziebarth (2016) estimate that, in a given week of the year, the total demand for paid sick leave sums
to 10 percent of the workforce in the United States. In addition to concerns about inequality, worker
well-being, and work productivity, a lack of sick leave coverage can induce contagious employees to
work sick and spread diseases (Pichler and Ziebarth, 2017).
In the past decade, support for sick pay mandates has grown substantially in the United States. On
the city level, the first sick pay mandates were implemented in San Francisco (2007), Washington, D.C.
(2008), Seattle (2012), New York City (2014), Portland (2014), Newark (2014), Philadelphia (2015), and
Oakland (2015). Several dozen cities, including Pittsburgh, Santa Monica, Los Angeles, or Chicago, have
followed more recently (for an overview, see A Better Balance (2018)).
On the state level, Connecticut was first to mandate paid sick leave in 2012. However, the bill ex-
cludes businesses with less than 50 full-time employees and only applies to the service sector; it only
covers about 20 percent of the workforce (Miller and Williams, 2015; Connecticut Department of La-
nell University (PAM), HEC Lausanne, the University of Linz (Economics Department), RAND Corporation in
Santa Monica, CA, the University of Utah, the 12th Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies in Ithaca, NY,
the 2017 Essen Health Conference, the Nordic Health Economics Study Group meeting (NHESG) in Uppsala,
the 2017 meetings of the Southern Economic Association in Tampa, FL, and the Verein for Socialpolitik (VfS) in
Mu¨nster for their helpful comments and suggestions. We also thank Katherine Wen for editing this paper. Gen-
erous funding from the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation’s Policies for Action Program (#74921) and the W.E.
Upjohn Institute for Employment Research’s Early Career Research Awards (ECRA) program #17-155-15 is grate-
fully acknowledged. Neither we nor our employers have relevant or material financial interests that relate to the
research described in this paper. We take responsibility for all remaining errors in and shortcomings of the paper.
1
bor, 2015). In contrast, California passed a much more comprehensive bill—covering all employees—
effective July 1, 2015. Massachusetts and Oregon also passed relatively comprehensive sick pay man-
dates, effective July 2015 and January 2016, but exempt small businesses. In addition, Vermont, Arizona,
and Washington State passed sick leave legislation very recently. Table 1 lists all citywide (nine in total)
and statewide (four in total) sick pay mandates that this paper will evaluate.
On the federal level, reintroduced in Congress in 2015, the Healthy Families Act proposes a fed-
eral sick pay mandate that would cover employees in businesses with more than 15 employees (U.S.
Congress, 2015). Similar to the mandates already in place at the state or city level, the Healthy Families
Act proposes that employees “earn” one hour of paid sick leave per 30 hours worked, up to 56 hours (or
seven days) per year. Paid sick leave—at the standard wage rate of 100 percent—could then be taken in
case of own sickness or sickness of a relative, in most cases children.
The main source of controversy is the possibility that government mandated sick pay could hurt
employment or wage growth. The standard economics textbook example of mandated benefits argues
(Summers, 1989): Employer mandates may be more efficient than a direct provision of benefits by the
government (funded by higher taxes), as long as employees value the benefit and would accept lower
wages in return. Gruber (1994) studies the impact of maternity leave mandates on employment and
wages in the United States. He argues that the case for a group-specific mandate may deviate from
the textbook example because antidiscrimination laws or social norms may prohibit the free downward
adjustment of wages for a specific identifiable group. Using the CPS, Gruber (1994) finds significant
wage decreases for women of childbearing age, but no significant impact on labor supply.
The case of mandated sick pay may also deviate from the textbook example. Assuming flexible
wages and absent administrative costs, earning one hour of paid sick leave per 30 hours worked equals
a wage increase of 1/30 or 3.3 percent per week for full-time employees. However, such a static calcu-
lation assumes that all employees would fully exhaust their annual sick leave credit and would have
worked sick with full productivity (or taken unpaid leave) in the counterfactual scenario. Empirically
assessing and directly measuring labor productivity under the two scenarios is extremely challenging (if
not impossible). To our knowledge, empirical causal evidence on how work productivity changes when
employees gain access to paid sick leave is lacking. It seems likely that sick employees cannot maintain
full work productivity when working sick and that employees on sick leave will (partly) compensate
for their lost productivity after their recovery. Hence, the calculated static wage increase of 3.3 percent
appears to be an upper bound for marginal firms.
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When ignoring administrative costs, changes in work productivity, and psychological costs or ben-
efits, the textbook example predicts that sick pay mandates would reduce wage growth. However, if
wages cannot flexibly adjust because of social norms, antidiscrimination laws, minimum wages or be-
cause employees do not value sick leave, marginal employees might not get hired or even get fired.
In addition, when small businesses are exempt from the mandate, some employers could reduce their
workforce or split up their firms. In sum, under several plausible scenarios, the standard textbook ex-
ample may not hold up in reality. Then, it becomes essentially an empirical question whether wages
and employment would be significantly affected by sick pay mandates.
This paper empirically assesses how city and state-level sick pay mandates affected wages and em-
ployment in the United States. We use the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW) by the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) for this evaluation. The QCEW is a census of all establishments that are 
covered by Unemployment Insurance and contains 97 percent of nonfarm employment in the United 
States. Our first QCEW data set records total monthly employment and quarterly wages at the county(-
industry) level from January 2001 to June 2016. The second data set records total monthly employment 
and quarterly wages at the state-industry-firm-size level from January 2001 to June 2 016. Econometri-
cally, we exploit the quasi-random nature of the implementation of the sick pay mandates across U.S. 
regions and over time. To mimic pretreatment trends as closely as possible, we follow Abadie and 
Gardeazabal (2003) and Abadie et al. (2010) and build synthetic control groups using untreated regional 
units. To test hypotheses with single and multiple events, we use the approach in Dube and Zipperer 
(2015) and Firpo and Possebom (2017). In a recent review of the state of applied econometrics, Athey 
and Imbens (2017) call the synthetic control group method (SCGM) the most important innovation in 
program evaluation in the last 15 years.1
The setting of this paper is well-suited for the application of the SCGM. First, when evaluating re-
forms at the county level, we can build synthetic controls using a large pool of more than 3,000 U.S.
counties. To our knowledge, this is one of the very first papers to select donors out of the total pool of
U.S. counties. It allows us to replicate the labor market dynamics of the treated counties very closely.
Second, because the treated units are rather small and geographically dispersed, the assumption of no
general equilibrium or spillover effects to neighboring regions seems justified. Third, we can match the
labor market dynamics of the treated units for a long pre-reform time period. Fourth, we evaluate sick
pay mandates in nine counties and four states. All these U.S. regions were treated with similar reforms
1 Other papers that apply the SCGM or variants include Billmeier and Nannicini (2013); Bohn et al.
(2014); Bauhoff (2014); Bassok et al. (2014); Karlsson and Pichler (2015), and Restrepo and Rieger (2016).
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and the policies were implemented subsequently over a decade. Moreover, the regions are heteroge-
neous in terms of size and local labor markets and thus provide broad common support. As a result,
the findings should have external validity for other U.S. counties with a similar industrial structure and
policy environment. Finally, the main identification assumption of no systemic unobserved postreform
labor market shocks is weak(er) when evaluating thirteen reforms over a decade.
Our findings do not provide much evidence that either employment or wages significantly and
systematically increased or decreased postreform. The main point estimates have ambiguous signs
and are relatively small in size. Joint tests let us exclude that employment decreases of 2 percent or
more lie within the 92 percent confidence interval. Wage decreases of 3 percent or more lie outside
the 95 percent confidence interval, which let us exclude that administrative and psychological costs are
large (see above for a static back-of-the envelope calculation). Moreover, the results are very robust
to alternative SCGM matching algorithms and when focusing on the most affected industries (such as
the construction or hospitality sector). The findings are also supported by traditional Difference-in-
Differences (DD) models and event studies. In sum, this paper follows Abadie (2018)’s call for “a visible
reporting and discussion of non-significant results in empirical practice.”
The next section summarizes the literature. Section 3 discusses the U.S. sick pay mandates in more
detail, and Section 4 explains the data. The empirical approach and identifying assumptions are in
Section 5. Section 6 discusses the empirical findings, and Section 7 concludes.
2 Research on Sick Leave
Economic research on sick leave almost exclusively focuses on countries outside the United States. In 
the past, the simple reason has been a lack of policy variation and a lack of appropriate data. For 
example, high-quality administrative sick leave data exist in most Scandinavian countries (Andre`n, 
2007; Markussen et al., 2011; Dale-Olsen, 2014) but, in the United States, actual sick leave behavior is 
largely unobservable. There are a few exceptions. One exception is Gilleskie (1998), who exploits 1987 
MEPS data to structurally model work absence behavior and simulate the effects of alternative policies. 
According to Gilleskie (1998), about a quarter of all male employees would not take sick leave when ill. 
Susser and Ziebarth (2016) use the representative 2011 ATUS Leave Supplement to estimate that, in a 
given week of the year, 2 percent of U.S. employees—mostly low-income female employees—would go 
to work sick. In almost half of all cases, the reasons indicated for such presenteeism behavior were 
directly related to a lack of sick leave coverage. Ahn and Yelowitz (2016) confirm that U.S. employees
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take more sick leave when they have sick leave coverage. And Colla et al. (2014) find that, in San
Francisco, 73 percent of all firms offered sick pay voluntarily before the mandate in 2006, and that this
share had increased to 91 percent by 2009. Some reports suggest that the early mandates in San Francisco
and D.C. did not have negative employment effects (Boots et al., 2009; Drum Major Institute for Public
Policy, 2010; Appelbaum and Milkman, 2011). Using 2009 to 2012 data from the American Community
Survey, Ahn and Yelowitz (2015) come to a similar conclusion for Connecticut.2
Van Kammen (2015) also uses the QCEW to evaluate U.S. sick pay mandates but a different method-
ological approach. His findings a lso d iffer f rom t he fi ndings in  th is pa per. Us ing da ta from 20 03 to 
2014, Van Kammen (2015) restricts the sample to counties with more than 10,000 employees and 144 
county-month observations, uses higher-order lags of employment as instruments, and finds evidence 
for generally negative employment effects (although they partly lack precision). However, using a bal-
anced sample with select county-industry observations and interacting the treatment effects with the 
average number of sick days at the industry level in 2010, he concludes “the effect of paid sick days 
mandates is to shift employment from the least constrained industries [utilities] to the most constrained 
[accommodation and food services], having a practically small effect on overall county 
employment” (Van Kammen 2015, p. 17).
Outside the United States, several empirical papers estimate the causal effects of variation in sick
pay. These studies find that employees adjust their intensive labor supply in response (Johansson and
Palme, 2005; Ziebarth and Karlsson, 2010, 2014; De Paola et al., 2014; Dale-Olsen, 2014; Fevang et al.,
2014). The focus of these papers naturally differs from others that study extensive labor supply ef-
fects of disability insurance (Autor and Duggan, 2006; Kostol and Mogstad, 2014; Borghans et al., 2014;
Burkhauser et al., 2016). It is closer to U.S. studies on work-related accidents and diseases covered by
Workers’ Compensation (Meyer et al., 1995; McInerney and Bronchetti, 2012; Powell and Seabury, 2018;
Hansen, 2016).
Other papers on sick leave investigate the role of general determinants (Markussen et al., 2011; Dale-
Olsen, 2014), probation periods, known to reduce absenteeism (Riphahn, 2004; Ichino and Riphahn,
2005), culture (Ichino and Maggi, 2000), gender (Ichino and Moretti, 2009; Gilleskie, 2010; Herrmann and
Rockoff, 2012), income taxes (Dale-Olsen, 2013), union membership (Goerke and Pannenberg, 2015), and
unemployment (Askildsen et al., 2005; Nordberg and Røed, 2009; Pichler, 2015). There is also research
2Similar to the findings in this paper, Colla et al. (2017) do not find evidence that the 2008 employer
health benefit mandate for non-small employers had a substantial effect on employment and wages in
San Francisco.
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on the impact of sick leave on earnings (Sandy and Elliott, 2005; Markussen, 2012). In addition, some
papers study the phenomenon of presenteeism explicitly (Brown and Sessions, 2004; Pauly et al., 2008;
Barmby and Larguem, 2009; Pichler, 2015; Pichler and Ziebarth, 2017).
Finally, note that paid sick leave differs from paid vacation or paid maternity leave in both scope
and aim (Rossin-Slater et al., 2013; Lalive et al., 2014; Baum and Ruhm, 2016; Dahl et al., 2016; Thomas,
2018). Whereas sick leave coverage is an insurance against wage losses due to health shocks, paid
vacation and maternity leave mostly aim at balancing family and work and address gender inequality
in the workplace. Sick pay mandates can also be justified from a public health perspective—because
access to paid sick leave reduces contagious presenteeism and the negative externalities associated with
the spread of contagious diseases (Pichler and Ziebarth, 2017; Stearns and White, 2018).
3 U.S. Sick Pay Mandates
The United States is one of three OECD countries without universal access to paid sick leave. About
half of the workforce lacks access to paid sick leave, particularly low-income employees in the service
sector (Heymann et al., 2009; Susser and Ziebarth, 2016).
The only existing federal law is The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA). It provides
unpaid leave in case of pregnancy, own disease, or disease of a family member to employees who
work at least 1,250 hours annually in businesses with at least 50 employees (see, for example, Tominey,
2016). Jorgensen and Appelbaum (2014) find that 49 million U.S. employees are ineligible for FMLA,
44 percent of all private sector employees. The findings in Susser and Ziebarth (2016) also suggest that
many low-wage and service sector employees are either not aware of their FMLA rights or that they are
not covered by the law. As a result of the sick pay mandates analyzed in this paper, most employees
without firm-provided sick pay gained access to sick leave coverage.
Table 1 provides a summary of the mandates evaluated by this paper. The details of the bills differ
from city to city and state to state, but basically all sick pay mandates are employer mandates. Several
mandates exclude small firms or offer exemptions. Employees “earn” a sick pay credit (typically one
hour per 30-40 hours worked up to 7 days per year) and, if unused, the credit rolls over to the next
calendar year. Because employees need to accrue sick pay credit, most mandates explicitly state a 90-day
accrual period in addition to waiting periods when changing jobs. Moreover, several bills that exempt
small businesses still require them to let their employees accrue unpaid sick days instead of paid sick
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days (Massachusetts Attorney General’s Office, 2016). Several laws explicitly prohibit employers from
requiring a doctor’s note (Polsky, 2016; New York City Consumer Affairs, 2016).
As Table 1 shows, San Francisco was the first city to mandate paid sick leave effective February 5,
2007.3 Washington D.C. enacted its mandate effective November 13, 2008, and expanded the mandate
on February 22, 2014 to include temporary workers and tipped employees. Seattle (September 1, 2012),
Portland (January 1, 2014), New York City (April 1, 2014), and Philadelphia (May 13, 2015) followed.
Connecticut was the first s tate to mandate paid s ick l eave o n January 1 , 2 012. H owever, the law 
only applies to service sector employees in non-small businesses and covers only about 20 percent of 
the workforce. The mandates of California (July 1, 2015), Massachusetts (July 1, 2015), and Oregon 
(January 1, 2016) are much more comprehensive (see Table 1).
4 Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW)
The paper makes use of publicly available data from the QCEW, which is provided by the Bureau of
Labor Statistics (BLS) (2018). The QCEW is based on an establishment census. It includes all establish-
ments covered by Unemployment Insurance (UI)—97 percent of all U.S. civilian employment.4 Using
the quarterly UI contribution reports filed by the establishments, the BLS calculates the number of actu-
ally filled jobs per month as well as the average weekly wage per quarter.
The BLS reports the data at different levels of spatial and timely disaggregation. To evaluate reforms
at the county and state level (see Table 1), we generate two data sets, one at the county level and one
at the state level. Both the county and state-level data are available from January 2001 to June 2016.
The raw data are reported by industry. Because the mandates mostly apply to the private sector, we
generate variables that measure private sector employment and private sector wages. While, the QECW
is available at the state level by county-industry-firm-size, at the county level it is only available by
county-industry.
3 In the case of San Francisco, two laws that went into effect January 2008 could potentially con-
found a clean assessment of the sick pay mandate. First, the minimum wage has been increased in 
predetermined steps annually from $8.50 in 2004 to $9.79 in 2009. Second, the Health Care Security 
Ordinance set minimum rates for employee health care spending by employers (those vary by firm size 
and for-profit status).




Table 2 provides the summary statistic for the county-level data. The table shows summary statistics
for 3,062 counties.5 As for employment, the data are at the monthly level, yielding a total of 548,992
county-month observations.6 As for wages, the data are at the quarterly level with a total of 182,992
county-quarter observations. Population counts are at the annual level with a total of 44,267 county-
year observations (U.S. Census Bureau, 2016b).
We generate several outcome variables for the county-level analysis. The first main outcome variable 
is Private Sector Employment, which we obtain by dividing the total number of filled jobs at the monthly 
county level by the annual county level population. This yields private sector jobs as a share of the 
county population for each U.S. county on a monthly basis. Table 2 shows that the average private 
sector employment share is 27.1 percent; the average public sector employment share is 7.7 percent. 
This means that, on average, for every 100 residents in a county in the United States, 27 private sector 
jobs paying UI contributions are officially reported.
Note that individuals who hold multiple jobs are counted for every job that they hold. In addition,
filled jobs are assigned to counties by the physical address of the establishment, not by the county of
residence of the jobholder. These are the two reasons (in addition to economic prosperity) that some
counties have significantly higher employment ratios than others, and even employment ratios above
100 percent. Whereas the minimum value for Private Sector Employment is only 1.1 percent, the maxi-
mum value is 404 percent (Table 2).
As shown in Table 2, while the county-level data do not allow us to differentiate by firm size, we can
differentiate by industry. Consequently, in extended analyses, we will test whether mandated sick pay
resulted in weaker job growth in the construction (1.5 jobs per 100 pop.) and the leisure and hospitality
industries (3.3 jobs per 100 pop.), as these two sectors were most affected by the mandates; prereform,
around 70 percent of all employees in these sectors did not have access to paid sick leave (Susser and
Ziebarth, 2016).
5In total, the United States has 3,143 counties or county-equivalents. The missing counties in our
data are counties without any official establishment location, e.g., in very rural counties in Alaska (U.S.
Census Bureau, 2016a).
6 To obtain one consistent baseline data set, we do not include all available data points from Jan-
uary 2001 to June 2016 but only include observations that we also use in the traditional difference-in-
differences Section 6.1 where we only consider data points up to 48 months prior to the treatment.
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The second main outcome variable is Weekly Wages. Employers report total quarterly gross com-
pensations, including bonus payments and stock options.7 Gross wages are then derived by dividing
the total quarterly compensation by the total quarterly employment. Dividing additionally by the num-
ber of weeks yields 182,992 county wage observations at the weekly level in Table 2. The average weekly
wage is $599 (or $31,200 per year), but the variation ranges from $155 to $4,542. Because Consumer Price
Indices are not available at the county level, throughout the paper we use nominal wages. However, we
net out wage seasonalities by regressing the wage dynamics of each county on a full set of quarter-year
fixed effects.
In addition to these two main outcome measures, we use the industry structure variables in Table 2
to build synthetic control counties that resemble the treatment counties as closely as possible.
4.2 State-Level Data
Table 3 provides the summary statistic for the state-level data. When considering all 51 states, we ob-
tain 8,981 state-month observations for employment and 2,992 state-quarter observations for wages.
Using the state-level data, this paper evaluates the sick pay mandates in Connecticut, California, Mas-
sachusetts, and Oregon.8 The Connecticut mandate only applies to private firms with more than 49
employees in the service sector, and the mandates in Massachusetts and Oregon only apply to private
firms with more than 9 employees (Table 1). Because the QCEW data are broken down by industry and
firm size (at the state level), we carve out employment and wage dynamics for private firms with more
than 49 employees in the service sector in Connecticut. For Oregon and Massachusetts, we generate all
outcome variables for private firms with more than 9 employees.9
7 We send an inquiry to the BLS to double check which fringe benefits are included in the reported
quarterly wage and received the following response on May 30, 2018: “Covered employers’ contribu-
tions to old-age, survivors, and disability insurance; health insurance; UI; workers compensation; and
private pension and welfare funds are not reported as wages. Employee contributions for the same
purposes, however, as well as money withheld for income taxes, union dues, and so forth, are reported,
even though they are deducted from the workers gross pay.”
8 We do not include Washington D.C. in the state-level analysis because the synthetic control group
fit was superior with counties.
9 Because the data by industry and firm size are only reported for the first quarter of each year, we
impute values for the other quarters assuming that the first quarter ratios of, e.g., <50 employees vs.
>49 employees, remain stable in the other three quarters. For two firm size categories in Delaware, we
impute missing values for 2014.
9
Analogous to the county-level data, the upper panel of Table 3 shows that, overall, private sector
employment was 37.3 and public sector employment 8.0 per 100 population at the state level. The
average weekly wage was $805, and the state population was on average 5.6 million.
The lower panel of Table 3 lists Private Service Sector Employment >49 employees as one main
outcome variable for Connecticut. Across all U.S. states, for every 100 residents of a state, 15.2 people
worked in the service sector and in establishments with more than 49 employees. Private Sector Em-
ployment >9 employees (31.2 per 100 pop.) is a main outcome variable for Oregon and Massachusetts.
In contrast, general Private Sector Employment is one main outcome measure for California, where the
mandate does not exempt small businesses.
4.3 Treatment and Control Regions
Treatment Regions. Table 1 lists treated cities and states. Whereas we evaluate all regions listed and also
provide graphs for all regions, some regions (e.g., employment in Washington, D.C. , or wages in New
York City and Hudson County) provide examples of where the SCGM is not a valid evaluation method
due to a poor fit. For example, in the case of D.C. the fit is poor because of the following three reasons:
1) D.C. has a very unique employment structure with many nonprofit, public sector, and lobbying jobs.
Thus, finding appropriate control counties for D.C. is very challenging. 2) D.C.’s original mandate had
many exemptions that are difficult to model with our data (e.g., no health care or restaurant workers).
Moreover, D.C. extended the mandate in September 2014, but retrospectively effective February 2014.
3) The first D.C. mandate became effective shortly after the Great Recession hit in October 2008. This
makes it very challenging to disentangle labor market effects due to the mandate from the confounding
effects of the Great recession. Because of the first reason, the recession also affected D.C. differently
than most other U.S. counties.10 To deal with special cases such as D.C., we experiment with several
alternative SCGM modeling approaches but remain cautious when drawing conclusions.
Table 1 lists all city mandates along with the relevant counties. However, city and county boundaries
are not always identical. First, the case for San Francisco (SF) is clear given that the city boundaries equal
the county boundaries.
10 As another example, Jersey City (Hudson County) has many small entrepreneurial businesses and
a large Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate industry. It lies just across the Hudson River opposite Man-
hattan.
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Second, we do not separately evaluate the five boroughs of New York City (NYC)11 but, using the
simple employment and wage averages of all five, aggregate them to one regional unit for three reasons:
1) The five boroughs together represent the entire area where the law formally applied. 2) Employment
ratios and wages in Manhattan are extremely high and they are relatively low in the other boroughs.
Moreover, most people who work in NYC live in one of the four surrounding counties and commute to
Manhattan. 3) NYC can be seen as one integrated labor market and not five separate ones. For these
reasons, we treat NYC as one statistical unit.
Third, in the case of Portland, Seattle, Newark, and Jersey City, the county boundaries are not iden-
tical to the city boundaries where the mandate formally applied. Portland almost entirely lies within
Multnomah County, but small portions fall into Clackamas and Washington County (which also include
large(r) parts that do not belong to Portland). Seattle, Newark, and Jersey City all lie within the county
that we use as treatment unit. For example, in 2014, King County had 2,079,967 residents but Seattle
only 668,342. Essex County had 795,723 residents but Newark only 280,579. And Hudson County had
669,115 residents in 2014, but Jersey City only 262,146 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2016c). The fact that these
three cities only make up a third of the total county population simply means that we evaluate the
intend-to-treat (ITT) effect for the entire county (not just the core cities as in the cases of SF and NYC).
If businesses relocated (due to the mandate) just outside the city boundaries but within the treatment
county boundaries, our method would not be able to identify such “border jumping” for Portland,
Seattle, Newark, and Jersey City. However, comparing the results for these treatment counties with
SF and NYC indirectly tests whether firms relocated just outside the city boundaries to circumvent the
mandate. This hypothesis would be reinforced, for example, if we found negative employment effects
for the core cities (SF and NYC) but no impact for entire counties that surround the core cities (Portland,
Seattle, Newark, Jersey City).
Control Regions. We employ the SCGM to model an ideal hypothetical control region for each
treatment region. Table 2 lists private sector employment, public sector employment, production em-
ployment and service sector employment, along with employment shares of specific industries such as
manufacturing, education and health services, or leisure and hospitality. In some modeling approaches,
we will use all of these industry structure variables to find suitable control “donor” counties. In other
words, in addition to identical prereform outcome dynamics, the SCGM algorithm selects control coun-
11 These are Manhattan, Kings County (Brooklyn), Bronx County, Richmond County (Staten Island),
and Queens County. We experimented with excluding Manhattan when averaging. The results are very
similar and are available upon request.
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ties with similar labor market and population structures than the treatment counties. Tables A1, A2, A6,
and A7 list all donor counties and states chosen to replicate the pretreatment employment and wage
dynamics of each treatment region as closely as possible. Section 5 below provides more details on the
estimation procedure. We also provide evidence from traditional DD models that use all nontreated
counties or states jointly as control units.
4.4 Sample Selection
The baseline data sets in Tables 2 and 3 are already restricted as follows: For each treatment region, we
focus on four pretreatment years (48 months or 16 quarters). Moreover, depending on when exactly the
mandate was enacted (Table 1), the postreform periods differ by treatment regions.
The county-level data set in Table 2 contains 3,062 unique counties. For the county-level SCGM 
analysis (not the state-level SCGM analysis or the traditional DD analysis), we additionally preselect 
suitable donor counties. (We do this because running the SCGM with 3,062 donor counties would 
technically be unfeasible due to multiple equilibria and too many degrees of freedom.) Specifically, we 
separately rank all 3,062 available counties on the three dimensions county population, private sector 
employment and private sector wages. Then, we select counties ranked above and below the treated 
county using a bandwidth of 500 ranks for the first dimension county population. Next, we proceed 
with the same procedure on dimensions two and three using the variables private sector employment 
and private sector wages. Finally, we use the counties that overlap on all three dimensions and fall 
within a ranking bandwidth of +/- 500 ranks on each dimension. This preselection procedure results in 
about 200 potential control counties for each treatment county (for exact values, see the denominator in 
column (5) of Table 4).
5 The Synthetic Control Group Method (SCGM)
To assess the causal effects of the sick pay mandates on employment and wages, we use Abadie and
Gardeazabal (2003)’s SCGM, along with traditional DD models in robustness checks. The SCGM uses
fractions of several natural control units to build an ideal—synthetic—control group whose prereform
outcome dynamics mimic those of the treatment group (Abadie et al., 2010). Given the assumptions
discussed below, differences in postreform outcome dynamics between the treatment and the synthetic
control group then yield evidence on causal reform effects (Athey and Imbens, 2017).
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In our context, following Table 1, the treatment units are counties or states that implemented sick
pay mandates; the potential control units consist of the remaining U.S. counties or states. Because we
analyze each treatment unit separately, the notation below refers to a single treatment and J control
units.




it)) that would have been observed
in region i at time t in the absence of the sick pay mandate. Moreover, y1it denotes the natural logarithm
of the outcome for the treated region i at time t, where the sick pay mandate was implemented at time
T0 + 1. We assume y1it = y
0
it∀t = 1, . . . , T0, ∀i = 1, . . . , J + 1.
Abadie et al. (2010) suggest that the following factor model represents the counterfactual y0it:
y0it = δt + θtZi + λtµi + eit (1)
where δt is a common time effect, θt is a vector of possibly time-dependent coefficients, λt is a vector of
unobserved common factors, and µi is a vector of unknown factor loadings.
The SCGM allows for some degree of treatment endogeneity because the treatment can be correlated
with unobservables. However, the method still requires several identification assumptions.
First, in our case, one necessary assumption is that employment rates and wages in the control re-
gions are not affected by the treatment. This implies the absence of spatial labor market spillovers. When
evaluating counties, the treatment units are rather small and thus unlikely to trigger large labor market
spillover effects. Also, in most cases, the treated counties are geographically distant from the control
counties. Tables A1, A2, A6, and A7 list all counties and states used to build the synthetic control units.
For example, the donor counties to evaluate employment dynamics in King County (WA) illustrate that
the “no spatial labor market spillover” assumption is rather weak: to replicate King County (WA), the
control donors are Fulton (GA), Somerset (NJ), Mecklenburg (NC), Durham (NC), Denver (CO), Madi-
son (AL), Harris (TX), Midland (TX), Winnebago (WI), and Mercer (NJ).
Second, similar to traditional DD models, no unobserved shocks should affect the outcome differ-
ently for treatment and control groups in postreform periods. In our case, shocks violating this assump-
tion would be other labor market policies that are correlated with sick pay mandates in treated regions
(but not in control regions). The SCGM may consider such shocks (better than traditional methods)
because the synthetic control units are, by construction, built to replicate the outcome dynamics of the
treated unit (which includes unobservables affecting such outcome dynamics).
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Third, again similar to traditional DD models, treatment-induced migration could lead to biases. If
employment prospects worsened due to sick pay mandates and employees lost their jobs, they might
migrate to more prosperous counties. Likewise, firms could relocate in response to mandates. For
several reasons, economic migration is unlikely to be a major confounder in our context: Our data and
outcome measures allow us to directly test for such possible migration pattern. In fact, it is precisely one
objective of this paper to test for changes in employment rates. Recall that we use official population
data and normalize employment. Because we stratify the effects by the time since implementation,
we would identify negative employment effects due to migration over time. When evaluating county
effects, the treatment counties are unlikely to contaminate the donor counties (which are chosen out of a
total of 3,062 U.S. counties) by worker or firm relocation. In robustness checks, we also test for spillover
effects on neighboring counties and states.
Lastly, in most SCGM settings, only one single treatment unit is evaluated. We rely on 13 different
treatment regions—counties and states of different sizes. Single unobserved shocks may confound one
county or state. But it is very unlikely that 13 treatment units, with staggered treatments from 2007
to 2015, were all coincidentally affected by random unobserved labor market shocks unrelated to the
mandates.
5.1 Implementation
SCGM requires the estimation of two matrices: 1) V is the weighting matrix determining the relative 
predictive power of Zi and of yi
0
t, and 2) W is a vector of nonnegative weights attached to the J 
control countries. The criterion to be minimized is
‖X¯1 − X¯0W‖V =
√
(X¯1 − X¯0W)′ V (X¯1 − X¯0W), (2)
where X¯1 and X¯0 are vectors of averages over the pretreatment elements of Zi and yi for treated and
control units, respectively. In our case, X¯1 and X¯0 include the variables in Tables 2 and 3. This means
that, for the main county and state-level analysis, X¯1 and X¯0 include private sector employment and its
subcategories service sector employment and production sector employment along with public sector
employment as well as private sector wages. To avoid criticism of overfitting, we only include these
variables at the following points in time before the treatment: 36 months, 24 months, 12 months, and 1
month. In industry-structure robustness checks, we additionally use the employment shares in manu-
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facturing ; professional and business services ; education and health services ; trade ; transportation and
utilities as well as leisure and hospitality.12
We obtain an optimal weight matrix W∗(V) among all diagonal positive definite matrices, where the
elements of V minimize the distance to the outcome. This optimal weight matrix minimizes the root of
the mean squared prediction error (RMSPE ) for prereform periods:
RMSPE =
√
∑t (y1t − y0tW∗(V))2
T0
, (3)
where T0 represents the number of prereform time periods, i.e., in our case 48 months or 16 quarters. In
alternative specifications, we use six instead of four prereform years and stop minimizing the RMSPE
24 months prior to the treatment.
5.2 Treatment Effects and Inference
In addition to calculating the RMSPE for the prereform periods, we also calculate the RMSPEs for the
postreform periods and take the ratio of the two, as suggested by Abadie et al. (2010). Whereas the
prereform RMSPE is an indicator to assess the fit of the synthetic control group, the ratio between post
and prereform RMSPE indicates the size of a possible treatment effect. Assuming a stable model fit over
time, a RMSPE post/RMSPE pre > 1 would indicate a larger post than prereform RMSPE and thus a
treatment effect.
However, the RMSPE Ratio is only a measure of the relative treatment effect. The sign of the treat-





T − T0 , (4)





T − T0 . (5)
12 In our main analysis, we do not consider the full set of industry-structure variables in X¯j due to
memory and computing constraints.
15
In principle, the sign of the treatment effect could change over time. Then positive and negative
effects would cancel each other out. Still, then the PTE and LTE would provide evidence on the cumu-
lative sign and size of the long-run effect over all postreform periods.
To conduct inference, we follow Abadie et al. (2010) and run placebo estimates.13 Because we assess
multiple treatments at different points in time, we first construct placebo estimates for each treatment
unit. Then we rank the treated and all placebo estimates by their RMSPE Ratios. Following Abadie et al.
(2010), the rank of the true treatment estimate relative to the N placebo estimates then determines the
p-value of the H0 hypothesis of no treatment effect (H0 : RMPSE RatioTreat ≤ RMPSE RatioPlacebo). Math-
ematically, the p-value results from the percentile rank p = Fˆ(RMSPERatioe) for the event e, where Fˆ
stands for the empirical cumulative distribution of all RMSPE Ratios, as obtained by the placebo esti-
mates. For example, if the true treatment county had the highest rank among 99 + 1 (placebo + treat-
ment) counties, the p-value would be 1/100 = 0.01, the treatment effect would be highly significant, and
the H0 of no treatment effect could be rejected. In the results section, we carry out this testing procedure
for the RMPSE Ratio (Firpo and Possebom, 2017). Finally, we follow Dube and Zipperer (2015) and
calculate joint p-values based on the sum of the single p-values using the Irwin-Hall distribution.
As in the standard parametric case, p-values can be statistically insignificant for two reasons: either
there is no effect or we do not have enough statistical power to identify an effect. To assess the statistical
power of our estimates, we test the p-value of alternative hypotheses to analyze how narrow the confi-
dence intervals are. To do so, we follow the basic procedures in Dube and Zipperer (2015) and Firpo and
Possebom (2017): We set the hypothetical average treatment effect over all postreform periods equal to z
percent. Next, we recalculate the RMSPE Ratio with this hypothetical average treatment effect of z per-
cent.14 Then we carry out all N placebo estimates as above to assess the probability that our treated unit
(with the artificially set z percent treatment effect) originates from that distribution. Accordingly, we
calculate p-values and test the null hypothesis that the treatment effect equals zero. Using the notation
above, this means that we calculate modified p values, namely p = Fˆ(RMSPERatioez).15 To provide
additional intuition: In the SCGM setting, placebo estimates are usually produced to check whether the
treated unit differs from the placebo units. The placebo units are, by definition, non-treated units with
13 An alternative would be subsampling methods (Politis and Romano, 1994; Saia, 2017).
14Because we only set the average effects to z percent, this method implicitly keeps the original vari-
ance between treated and synthetic control units.
15 Dube and Zipperer (2015) propose a similar test based on elasticities. Moreover, in a previous
version (Pichler and Ziebarth, 2016) we construct the test statistic using the LTE and the PTE. However,
as pointed out by an anonymous referee, Firpo and Possebom (2017) show in a simulation exercise that
using the RMSPE Ratio is preferable because of statistical power.
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a treatment effect of zero. Here, this basic idea is modified and we assign an artificial treatment effect of 
z percent. Then, as in the standard case, we assess the likelihood that the artificially treated unit stems 
from the distribution of nontreated placebo units. This procedure then shows whether we have enough 
power to reject the null of no effect, given that we assigned a known treatment effect of z percent.
6 Results
Section 6.1 begins by evaluating the overall employment and wage effects of the city-level mandates
using our county-level QCEW data set and the SCGM. As falsification exercises, we run four alternative
SCGM modeling approaches that yield robust findings and provide better fits for a few counties (and
worse fits for others). Next, we provide complementary evidence from traditional DD models and event
studies. The subsequent subsection provides heterogeneity tests by specifically investigating effects in
the construction and hospitality sectors at the county level; those sectors were particularly affected by
the mandates. We also test for spillover effects of the policy to counties neighboring the treatment
counties. Then, Section 6.2 provides evidence on labor market effects at the state level. Analogous to
the city level case, we also investigate alternative modeling approaches, the construction and hospitality
sector, as well as evidence for spillover effects. Section 6.3 discusses potential explanations for possible
heterogeneity in effect sizes.
6.1 Labor Market Effects of City-Level Mandates
County-Level Employment and Wage Effects Using the Standard SCGM Approach
Figure 1 shows the evolution of county-level employment in five treatment counties as listed in Table
1. (The equivalent graphs for the remaining four counties are in the appendix, in Figure A1.) In the
left column of Figure 1, the solid lines represent the treatment counties and the dashed lines represent
the synthetic control counties. The composition of each synthetic control county—the weights W of the
J control counties—-are in Table A1. The solid vertical lines at point zero on the x-axes represent the
months when the sick pay mandates went into effect and were enforced. The dotted lines to the left
indicate when the bills were passed; they test whether there is evidence of anticipation effects. The
dotted lines to the right indicate the end of the accrual periods.
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Figures 1 and A1 illustrate, first, substantial differences in employment rates. Whereas San Fran-
cisco and King County have employment rates of around 50 percent of the population, the rates for 
NYC and Philadelphia are below 40 percent. Second, the employment dynamics of treated and 
synthetic control counties are basically identical in the prereform periods, suggesting that the 
SCGM produces valid counterfactuals. (One obvious exception is Washington, D.C., in Figure A1.) 
Third, visually, it is difficult to identify sizable and systematic reform-related employment effects. In 
postreform periods, the employment dynamics appear to be identical for all cities displayed. Fourth, 
to quantitatively evaluate the SCGM fit between treated and controls, to assess potential employment 
effects, and to conduct inference, we follow Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) and Abadie et al. (2010) 
and show all relevant statistics in Panel A of Table 4.
Column (1) of Table 4 shows the Employment Ratio, Y1it, defined as private sector employment as a
share of the county population—averaged over all prereform periods.
Column (2) shows the RMSPEs for prereform years as specified in Equation (3). Note that we take the
logarithm of the outcome variable before minimizing. Thus, the values in column (2) can be interpreted
as percentages of the outcome variable. With the exception of D.C. (which we disregard due to a poor
fit but show for completeness in Figure A1), all prereform RMSPEs are very low—at around 1% of
the outcome measure. This implies a very successful replication of the employment dynamics of the
treatment counties by the SCGM. As a comparison, evaluating the effects of a tobacco control program
on cigarette consumption in California, Abadie et al. (2010) have a prereform RMSPE of 3 relative to a
mean of about 100.
Column (3) shows the RMSPEs for postreform years. They appear to be slightly larger than pre-
reform. This conjecture is confirmed by the RMPSE Ratios, which are shown in column (4) and divide
column (3) by column (2). The RMPSE Ratios lie between 1 for Alameda County and 4 for San Francisco.
(As comparison, Abadie et al. (2010) report significant results and a ratio of 11.4.)
Next, we conduct inference using placebo methods (see Section 5). For each treatment county, as
described in Section 4.4, we select nontreated placebo counties with similar labor markets and demo-
graphics. Then we replicate the standard SCGM procedure with each placebo county pretending it had
been treated at the same time as the real treatment county. Column (5) illustrates the calculation of the
p-values for the hypothesis H0 : RMSPE RatioTreat ≤ RMSPE RatioPlacebo, which is simply the rank of
the RMSPE Ratio of the treated county divided by #Total Counties Assessed. In other words: After cal-
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culating the RMPSE Ratio for each placebo county and ranking all of them, we can assess the position
of the true RMPSE Ratio for the treated county in the test statistic distribution (Abadie et al., 2010). As
seen in column (5), the total number of SCGM runs for each treatment county varies between 83 and 199
(placebo + 1). Moreover, the ranks of the true treatment county lie between 23 (NYC) and 139 (Alameda).
Accordingly, except for NYC (p=0.13), none of the p-values is even close to being statistically significant
at conventional levels.
We also calculate the sum of all p-values (excluding D.C. because of a poor pre-RMSPE fit) and then
evaluate their joint p-value based on the Irwin-Hall distribution (Dube and Zipperer, 2015). The overall
p-value for the county-level employment effect is 0.25.
The right columns of Figures 1 and A1 display the permutation inference using placebo tests graph-
ically. Following the convention in the literature, the graphs plot the differences in the logarithms of
the employment ratios (solid black) along with the differences for all placebo SCGM runs (gray) with
good fit (RMSPEPlacebo ≤RMSPETreat · 2). As seen, for prereform periods, the solid black line fluctu-
ates very closely around the horizontal zero line implying that the synthetic control units very closely
map the employment dynamics of the treatment units. After the reform, which is indicated by the black
solid vertical line, employment differentials between treated and control counties remain very small and
straight flat for most counties. One exception is SF, where the differential appears to be even positive,
although it is not significant in a statistical sense.
Column (6) of Table 4 shows the Percent Treatment Effect (PTE), and column (7) shows the Level
Treatment Effect (LTE) for the postreform periods; the LTE is private sector employment as a share of
the county population. As seen, the signs of the calculated treatment effects are ambiguous (four are
negative and four are positive); none are statistically significant at conventional levels.
Finally, columns (8) and (9) test whether we have enough statistical power to reject potential em-
ployment decreases of 3 and percent, respectively (see Section 5.2). Both columns provide p-values for
the hypotheses H0 : PTETreat = 0; inference is again based on the rank of the RMSPE Ratio (Firpo and
Possebom, 2017). The bottom of Panel A provides the joint p-values for all counties (excluding D.C.),
which is 0.08 in column (8), implying that we could identify employment decreases of 2% with 92%
statistical probability.
Next we evaluate wage effects using graphs and test statistics in Figures 2 and A2 and in Panel A of
Table 5. The structure follows that of employment effects. Recall that the wages are quarterly nominal
wages that have been detrended of seasonal fluctuations (Section 4).
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Figures 2 and A2 show positive wage dynamics representing rising nominal wages. Not only do
the wage levels differ substantially between local labor markets, but so do the slopes representing wage
growth. This is why we decided against further manipulation of the raw data, for example, correcting
for the consumer price index. First, the SCGM is able to precisely replicate local and time-variant dif-
ferences in wage dynamics. Actually, it is a method that is very well suited for such purposes. Second,
because no monthly (or quarterly) county-level CPI measure is available, one would have to convert
nominal wages into presumably “real” wages using a common discount rate which, however, would
not capture the properties of the local labor markets appropriately.
As illustrated by the many prereform RMSPEs below 0.03 (column [2] of Table 5), most treatment re-
gions show very good pre-treatment fits among the treated and the synthetic control counties. However,
using this standard SCGM approach, it was impossible to find synthetic control groups with “accept-
able” fits for NYC and Hudson County.16 The reasons are the nonrepresentative wage levels in NYC
(by far the highest wages among all treatment regions, column (1) of Table 5), as well as in Jersey City
(Hudson County).
Furthermore, Table 5 shows the statistically insignificant RMSPE Ratios (column [5]) and that the
PTEs fluctuate without any clear trend between -0.5% (Essex County) and +5.4% (Alameda County)
in column (6). Overall, there is not much evidence for significantly weaker wage growth as a result
of mandating sick pay. Visually, it is hard to detect substantial and systematic wage effects (Figures
2 and A2). According to the county joint tests (which exclude NYC and Hudson County because of
the poor pre-RMSPE fit), we could identify wage decreases of 3 percent with a statistical probability
of 95%. Below, in Section 6.3, we provide a detailed discussion of expected effect sizes. Because the
mandates force employers to provide one hour of paid sick leave for every 30 to 40 hours worked, a
static calculation that ignores administrative and psychological (“business climate”) costs would yield
wage decreases of up to 3.3% for marginal firms.
16 There is no firm threshold for an “acceptable” fit defined by the literature. We consider the fit
acceptable for an RMSPE< 0.1. Using our “alternative modeling approaches” below, we find acceptable
fits. The same is true when we disregard Manhattan when evaluating NYC (available upon request).
These alternative approaches also yield no evidence for treatment effects.
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Alternative SCGM Modelling Approaches
Figure 3 visually compares our standard modeling approach with four alternative SCGM modeling
approaches for five counties and employment (left columns) as well as wages (right column). Figure A3
shows the results for the remaining four treatment counties. The black solid lines are the benchmark
and depict the differences in outcome dynamics using our standard SCGM procedure, i.e., they equal
the right columns of Figures 1 and 2. (Note that we reset the SCGM algorithm and the selection of donor
counties at the beginning of each of these alternative modeling approaches.)
The black dashed lines represent an approach that uses additional covariates on the industry-structure
of the county to select synthetic control and placebo counties (see Table 2 for the covariates and Section
5.2 for the procedure). The gray solid lines use six instead of four pretreatment years; and the gray
dashed lines use six instead of four pretreatment years but stop applying the SGCM algorithm two
years before the law’s enactment. Finally, the light gray solid lines use a modified outcome variable
based on the log difference between the outcome in the current period and the period before the law’s
enactment. The main statistical indicators for each approach are in Table A3 (Appendix).
In summary, the findings of our main modeling approach are fairly robust to these alternative mod-
eling approaches. All lines fluctuate closely and mostly in a parallel fashion. However, there are a few
instances where these alternative approaches, in particular (v), help to improve the modeling fit for
counties with a bad fit. This applies to employment in Washington, D.C. (Figure A3, left column, third
row) and wages in Hudson County (Figure A3, right column, last row). In terms of content, these alter-
native modeling approaches with improved fit corroborate the main findings of no employment or wage
effects. Also, while the modeling fit of a few treatment counties can be improved with alternative SCGM
approaches, it worsens for other treatment counties. We conclude that the standard modeling approach
performs reasonably well for the majority of counties, but alternative SCGM modeling techniques can
help to improve the fit if this is not the case.
Traditional Difference-in-Differences Approaches
This subsection runs traditional DD models as robustness checks. We use the baseline QCEW data set as
in Table 2 and keep all nontreated counties as control counties in the sample. Then we exploit variation
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in the implementation of city-level mandates across counties and over time by estimating the following
model:
yit =α+ βTreatedCountyi × Lawt + γTreatedCountyi × Lawt × LawTimet (6)
+ θZit + δt + ρi + ρs × t+ eit
where yit = ln(Yit) is the logarithm of the outcome variables in county i at time t as above. TreatedCountyi
is a dummy that indicates counties that implemented sick pay mandates, and Lawt is a postreform
dummy. Thus, β represents the standard average DD treatment effect for postreform periods. In some
specifications, we additionally estimate a second treatment coefficient, γ, that provides information
about the slope of the treatment effect over time for postreform periods (e.g., to consider the possibility
that the effects increase slowly over time, see Lafortune et al. (2018) for a similar application).
δt represents month-year or quarter-year fixed effects, ρi are county fixed effects, and ρs×t are state-
specific time trends. Zit is a vector of county-year specific control variables.
Table 6 shows the results for 14 DD models, where each column in each panel represents on model
as in Equation (6). Panel A shows the findings for employment, and Panel B shows the findings for
wages. Even and uneven columns differ by the sets of covariates included, as indicated in the bottom
of the table. We run three main specifications for both wages and employment, where LawE f f ectivet
represents the month when the mandate became effective, LawPassedt the month when the bill was
passed, and ProbationOvert the month when the accrual period was over (see Section 3). In addition,
column (7) reports two specifications where we simultaneously control for TreatedCountyt×LawPassedt
and TreatedCountyt×LawE f f ectivet.17
None of the 14 main DD coefficient estimates is statistically significant from zero. Moreover, the
approximate point estimates in percent of the outcome are relatively small and fluctuate around 0.5
percent. In addition, the estimates’ signs are not consistently positive or negative but alternate.
17This is feasible as the time elapsed between the passage and the implementation of the
mandates varies across regions. However, we abstained from additionally controlling for
TreatedCountyt×ProbationOvert as the accrual period is almost always 90 days; thus we would run
into multicollinearity iusses, particularly with the quarterly wage data.
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Finally, we plot two standard event studies in Figure 4. Technically, we replace the binary Lawt
indicator in Equation (6) by a continuous time indicator counting the months (or quarters) up to and
since the reform became effective. (Note that we also control for state-specific time trends in the event
study specification.) The point estimates for these time dummies are then plotted in Figure 4, where
zero on the x-axis indicates when the mandate became effective.
In line with the findings in Table 6, Figure 4 shows relatively smooth estimates without much trend-
ing. Almost none of the point estimates, either before or after the reform, is statistically significant from
zero. This is illustrated by the gray bars, representing the 95 percent confidence interval, which fully
covers the horizontal x-axis.
Evidence from the Construction and Hospitality Sectors
Now, we zoom into specific sectors of the economy. So far, we have evaluated employment and wage
effects for entire counties and all sectors. However, it is known that some sectors were more affected by
the mandates than others. In particular, in the construction and service sector industries, prereform sick
leave coverage rates had been very low—only at around 30 percent (Susser and Ziebarth, 2016).
Figure 5 and Figures A4 to A7 show results for employment in the construction and hospitality. Due
to space constraints, we graphically solely show results for San Francisco, Philadelphia, King County,
NYC, Multnomah, and Essex County (the remaining graphs are available upon request). The test statis-
tics for all counties and states are in Table A4. For each sector and outcome variable, we reset the SCGM
algorithm and the selection of donor counties using only labor market outcomes of the specific sector
under consideration.
First of all, focusing on specific industries within counties comes at the cost of slightly worse, but
still acceptable, prereform RMSPE fits (columns [2] and [7] of Table A4). The graphical evidence con-
firms this impression. Particularly for employment in the construction sectors of Philadelphia and King
County, the SCGM does not perform well. But, given the very low levels of construction in these two
counties (<1 percent), and the fact that we had to drop counties with zero construction employment
(because we take the log before applying SCGM), this is perhaps not surprising. As for the other coun-
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ties, we again do not see much evidence that employment systematically and significantly increased or
decreased.
As for employment in the hospitality sector, the prereform RMSPE fit is better. However, the results
still show no consistent pattern. Judged by the test statistics, most PTEs are positive (Table A4). The
statistic for Washington, D.C., is statistically significant at the 6 percent level (with a mediocre fit) and
the statistic for San Francisco is statistically significant at the 9 percent level. Graphically, there appears
to be suggestive evidence that employment in the hospitality sector may have even increased in San
Francisco (Figure 5, right column, third row). No such evidence exists for the other counties.
The case is very similar for wages dynamics in both sectors as shown by Figures 6, A6, and A7 as
well as Table A4. When focusing on cases with a good pre-RSMPE fit, the evidence suggests either no
effects (Philadelphia, Essex, and King County for Construction) or suggestive light evidence for rising
wages (King and Essex County for Hospitality).
Testing for Spillover Effects on Neighboring Counties
The final robustness check tests whether there is any evidence for spillover effects of the mandates
on neighboring counties. Although we do not find much evidence for systematic employment or wage
effects, it is conceivable that some businesses relocated just outside the county boundaries to circumvent
the mandate. It is also conceivable that hypothetical (positive or negative) labor market effects spread
to neighboring counties.
Table A5 (Appendix) shows the results of the spillover tests for neighboring counties. First, although
there are a few exceptions, columns (1) and (5) show very good prereform RMSPE fits. Second, as shown
by columns (3) and (7), the PTEs do not have consistent signs: 18 out of 38 tested neighboring counties
have negative employment signs, and the remainder have positive employment signs.
In terms of statistical significance, to conduct thorough statistical inference, one would have to cal-
culate placebo estimates for all 38 neighboring counties and around 150 placebos for each neighbor
(resulting in roughly 5,700 SCGM estimations). To avoid excessive calculations, we rely on the empiri-
cal distributions of the placebo estimates from Tables 4 and 5. The empirical distributions suggest that
the cutoff for a p-value of 0.05 is at an RMSPE Ratio of 5.1 for employment and at an RMSPE Ratio of
6.7 for wages. The largest RMSPE Ratios in Table A5 are Contra Costa, CA (7.5), and Santa Clara, CA,
(6.7) for employment (with no values exceeding 5 for wages); these two estimates are probably signifi-
cant in a statistical sense. The point estimates suggest a negative employment effect for these counties,
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which could imply that firms (and/or employees) relocated to the neighboring counties San Francisco
or Alameda where the mandates applied. On the other hand, we advise caution as these are only 2 out
of 38 cases, which lies within a conventional 6 percent statistical error probability rate.
6.2 Labor Market Effects of State-Level Mandates
State-Level Employment and Wage Effects
The graphical evidence for the state-level results is in Figure 7 (Employment) and Figure 8 (Wages).
Panels B of Tables 4 (Employment) and 5 (Wages) show the test statistics analogous to the city-level
case. Note that we are able to differentiate by firm size and industry and only focus on employment
and wage effects in treated firms and industries, that is, private service sector firms with more than
49 employees in Connecticut and private sector firms with more than 9 employees in Massachusetts
and Oregon. As above, Figures A8 and A9 (Appendix) provide robustness checks using four different
modeling approaches.
Again, the graphs and test statistics provide clear and consistent evidence: First, the standard SCGM
modeling approach performs well in most cases. In the few instances when the fit is not great (e.g.
California and wages), the alternative modeling approaches clearly improve the fit. Second, visually and
when studying the test statistics, there is no evidence for systematic labor market effects of substantial
size and significance. None of the RMSPE Ratios is statistically significant at conventional levels (Panels
B of Tables 4 and 5).18 Third, if the effect sizes were significant, most of them would suggest that the
employment and wage effects are rather positive than negative.
Evidence from the Construction and Hospitality Sectors
In the appendix, we show separate findings for the construction and hospitality industry in Connecticut
(Figure A10), California (Figure A11), Massachusetts (Figure A12), and Oregon (Figure A13).
Again, the findings from the city-level mandates hold up. With some exceptions (e.g., Massachusetts
and Wages), the standard SCGM performs well and is able to closely replicate the labor market dynamics
18 Note that the Irwin Hall joint tests for counties and states at the bottom of Tables 4 and 5 implicitly
assume that the cities and states were similarly affected by the mandates. However, because the industry
structures and exceptions differ across regions (Table 1), this is not necessarily the case.
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of the treatment states using fractions of other states as shown in Table A4. Moreover, the visual and
analytic analysis does not provide evidence for significant employment or wage effects in any of the
states or sectors.
Testing for Spillover Effects on Exempt Firms and Sectors
As a very final test we investigate whether exempt firms within a state (because of size or industry) may
have been affected by the mandates. In other words, we replicate the spillover analysis from above but
do not test effects on neighboring states but on exempt firms and sectors in the same state (results are
in Table A8). The largest RMSPE Ratio is 4.0 for Connecticut. This is comparable to other insignificant
ratios in Tables 4 and 5. Thus, the results are again robust in the sense that we are unable to identify
statistically significant and systematic labor market effects for exempt industries and firms.
6.3 Discussion of Effect Sizes
As shown by Tables 4 and 5, overall, there is very little evidence that employment or wages varied
systematically as a result of the city or state-level sick pay mandates. The SCGM inference procedure
(see Section 5.2) almost never allows us to conclude that employment and wage dynamics have been
significantly different in treated cities or states. Moreover, the sign and sizes of the PTEs and LTEs
(columns [6] and [7]) do not follow a consistent pattern that, in our opinion, corroborates the main
conclusion of no systematic employment or wage effects.
As discussed in the Introduction, the standard textbook example would predict negative wage ef-
fects as a result of mandated sick pay. A static calculation would yield wage decreases of up to 3.3 per-
cent under several assumptions. Relaxing these assumptions would predict ambiguous wage effects,
depending on the assumption. For example, how and whether sick leave affects work productivity is
crucial but there exists no empirical causal evidence on this question. It could be reasonable to assume
either, that overall work productivity increases or decreases when employees gain access to paid sick
leave. Similarly, assumptions about (unobserved) administrative and psychological (“business climate”)
costs appear to be crucial when making predictions about employment effects. Ultimately, we take the
view that employment and wage effects are an empirical question. And we do not find evidence for
systematic employment and wage effects.
There may be one or two exemptions, though. In Section 6.1, we find suggestive evidence for positive
wage effects in the construction sector of Hudson County (NJ) and Alameda County (CA). Both effects
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are marginally significant and have good SCGM fits. Similarly, we find suggestive evidence for positive
employment effects in the hospitality sector of San Francisco (CA)19 and positive wage effects in the
hospitality sector of King County (WA). (On the other hand, one could argue that these are only 4
marginal cases out of 52 in Table A4, which lies entirely within a 10 percent false positive rate.)
There are several possibilities to rationalize positive employment and wage effects as a result of sick
pay mandates. First, it is possible that sick pay mandates correct market inefficiencies and effectively re-
duce negative externalities such as infection rates among coworkers or customers (Pichler and Ziebarth,
2017). In fact, paradoxically, overall sick leave rates may fall when employees gain access to paid sick
leave (Stearns and White, 2018). When overall firm productivity goes up as a result of the mandate,
it could explain stronger wage growth. Second, it could simply be the case that wages cannot flexibly
adjust downward due to, for example minimum wage laws. Third, in a standard labor supply model, a
higher wage (and higher employment) can be a result of a downward-shifting labor supply curve (e.g.,
because jobs become more attractive for employees) and an upward-shifting labor demand curve (e.g.,
because customers demand more services), see Boeri and van Ours (2008). Finally, there exists anecdotal
evidence from qualitative employer surveys which were primarily conducted in San Francisco after the
first mandate was implemented in 2007. Boots et al. (2009) interviewed 26 employers and found that
most of those implemented the mandate with “minimal to moderate effects on their overall business
and their bottom line.” Moreover, “about half of the employers [...] tried to offset or minimize their
recent increased labor costs“ by “changes in other benefits or delayed wage increases [...]. (p.8)“
7 Discussion and Conclusion
Using the SCGM, this paper systematically evaluates the labor market consequences of nine city-level 
and four state-level sick pay mandates in the United States. The setting is well suited for the SCGM. 
First, especially when evaluating counties, we have a very rich pool of donor counties—in fact, thou-
sands of them—which we can exploit to build synthetic control counties that map the labor market 
dynamics of the treated counties very closely. We also rely on many pretreatment observations; match-
ing treated-control labor market dynamics over long prereform time periods strengthens the identifying 
assumptions of the SCGM. Because several of our treated units are very small and geographically dis-
persed, we can also plausibly assume the absence of general equilibrium and spillover effects from 
treated to control regions. Additionally, because we rely on many different treatment units with di-
19See footnote 3 for a discussion of potential confounding factors.
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verse labor markets, our findings have a broad range of common support and arguably high external
validity. Moreover, many treatment regions reduce the likelihood that unobserved shocks confounded
postreform labor market dynamics systematically.
Opponents of sick pay mandates are mainly concerned with negative employment or wage effects.
We do not find much evidence that employment and wage growth have been substantially and signif-
icantly dampened by mandating employers to allow employees to earn paid sick leave. This may be
a function of how the U.S. laws are designed. In fact, they seem to be more incentive-compatible than
their European counterparts and minimize shirking behavior, a main concern of opponents. The reason
for this incentive-compatibility is that paid sick days are personalized and employees “earn” them. For
every 30 to 40 hours worked—that is, for every week a full-time employee works—employees earn one
hour of paid sick leave. This means that employees earn about one day of paid sick leave for every
two months worked, up to (typically) seven days per year. Unused sick days roll over to the next year.
Because earned sick days represent a personalized insurance credit for future health shocks (similar to
health savings accounts) that are likely to occur (e.g., flu or disease of child), we expect shirking to play
a minimal role for most employees.
However, wages and employment could still be significantly affected due to administrative burdens
or psychological effects when employers overestimate the actual relevance for their businesses. We
show, however, that this was very likely not the case. Our estimates let us exclude employment losses
of more than 2 percent and wage reductions of more than 3 percent at conventional statistical levels.
While an even higher statistical precision would always be desirable, we agree with Abadie (2018) and
believe that much can be learned from such nonsignificant findings, especially in this policy-relevant
context. In our opinion, the overall findings from 9 city-level and four state-level mandates, in con-
junction with a lack of systematically positive or negative point estimates (and rather small effect sizes),
further corroborate our null findings.
This paper’s findings suggest that neither employment nor wage growth has been significantly af-
fected by U.S. sick pay mandates. However, the limitations of this study should be kept in mind and
require more research: Although we evaluate nice city-level and four state-level mandates, these regions
are not random subsamples of all U.S. regions. They tend to be relatively prosperous regions, governed
by Democrats, and have also more labor market regulations, higher minimum wages, and stricter em-
ployment projections. It is thus unclear whether the conclusions would also hold up in less prosperous
regions and regions with fewer labor market regulations.
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Philadelphia County, Pennsylvania
Note: The left column compares treated counties (solid lines) to the synthetic control counties (dashed lines). 
The composition of the synthetic control counties is in Table A1 (Online Appendix). All SCGM analyses are 
in logs; graphs in the left column display the exponentiated values in levels. The right column shows the 
difference of the logarithm of the employment ratios between treatment and synthetic control groups along 
with placebo estimates for counties with prereform RMSPEs smaller than 2 times the prereform RMSPE of 
the treated county (gray lines). The left dashed vertical lines indicate when the law was passed, the middle 
solid vertical lines indicate when the law became effective, and the right dashed vertical lines indicate when 
the probation period was over. For more information about the sick pay reforms, see Table 1. Source: QCEW 
(Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), 2018), own calculation and illustration.
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Philadelphia County, Pennsylvania
Note: The left column compares treated counties (solid lines) to the synthetic control counties (dashed lines). The 
composition of the synthetic control counties is in Tables A2 (Online Appendix). All SCGM analyses are in logs; 
graphs in the left column display the exponentiated values in levels. The right column shows the difference of 
the logarithm of the weekly wages between treated and synthetic control groups along with placebo estimates for 
counties with prereform RMSPEs smaller than 2 times the prereform RMSPE of the treated county (gray lines). 
The left dashed vertical lines indicate when the law was passed, the middle solid vertical lines indicate when the 
law became effective, and the right dashed vertical lines indicate when the probation period was over. For more 
information about the sick pay reforms, see Table 1. Source: QCEW (Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), 2018), own 
calculation and illustration.
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Philadelphia County, Pennsylvania
Note: The lines always show the difference of the employment ratios (left column) and weekly wages (right column) 
between treatment and synthetic control groups. The solid black lines show our standard modeling approach (right 
columns of Figures 1 and 2). The black dashed lines select synthetic control counties based on additional industry-
structure variables (Tables 2 and 3). The gray solid lines use six instead of four pretreatment years; the gray dashed 
lines use six instead of four years but stop applying the SGCM algorithm two years before the law’s enactment. The 
light gray solid lines use employment in levels, relative to employment in T-1. The left dashed vertical lines indicate 
when the law was passed and the solid vertical lines when the law became effective. Source: QCEW.
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Wage Effects
Note: The graphs show event studies based on traditional DD models similar to Equation (6), where the TreatedCounty
dummy is replaced by a time indicator that counts from 48 months before, up to 36 months after the enactment of the
city-level sick pay mandates. The errors terms are clustered at the county-level and the gray areas depict 95% confidence
intervals. For more information about the sick pay reforms, see Table 1. Source: QCEW (Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS),
2018), own calculation and illustration.
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Philadelphia County, Pennsylvania
Note: The left column compares treated counties (solid lines) to the synthetic control counties (dashed lines). All SCGM 
analyses are in logs; graphs in the left column display the exponentiated values in levels. The right column shows the 
difference of the logarithm of the employment ratios between treatment and synthetic control groups along with placebo 
estimates for counties with prereform RMSPEs smaller than 2 times the prereform RMSPE of the treated county (gray 
lines). The left dashed vertical lines indicate when the law was passed, the middle solid vertical lines indicate when the 
law became effective, and the right dashed vertical lines indicate when the probation period was over. Table A4 shows 
the according statistics. For more information about the sick pay reforms, see Table 1. Source: QCEW (Bureau of Labor 
Statistics (BLS), 2018), own calculation and illustration.
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Philadelphia County, Pennsylvania
Note: The left column compares treated counties (solid line) to the synthetic control counties (dashed line). All SCGM 
analyses are in logs; graphs in the left column display the exponentiated values in levels. The right column shows the 
difference of the logarithm of the weekly wage between treated and synthetic control groups along with placebo estimates 
for counties with prereform RMSPEs smaller than two times the prereform RMSPE of the treated county (gray lines). The 
left dashed vertical lines indicate when the law was passed, the middle solid vertical lines indicate when the law became 
effective, and the right dashed vertical lines indicate when the probation period was over. Table A4 shows the according 
statistics. For more information about the sick pay reforms, see Table 1. Source: QCEW (Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), 
2018), own calculation and illustration.
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Connecticut
Note: The left column compares treated states (solid line) to synthetic control states (dashed line). The composition of 
the synthetic control states is in Table A6 (Online Appendix). All SCGM analyses are in logs; graphs in the left column 
display the exponentiated values in levels. The right column shows the difference of the logarithm of the employment 
ratios between treatment and synthetic control groups along with placebo estimates for counties with prereform RMSPEs 
smaller than 2 times the prereform RMSPE of the treated state (gray lines). The left dashed vertical lines indicate when 
the law was passed, the middle solid vertical lines indicate when the law became effective, and the right dashed vertical 
lines indicate when the probation period was over. In Connecticut, the treatment group consists of private sector firms 
with at least 50 employees; in Oregon and Massachusetts, the treatment group consists of private sector firms with at least 
10 employees. For more information about the sick pay reforms, see Table 1. Source: QCEW (Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(BLS), 2018), own calculation and illustration.
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Connecticut
Note: The left column compares treated states (solid line) to the synthetic control states (dashed line). The composition 
of the synthetic control states is in Table A7 (Online Appendix). All SCGM analyses are in logs; graphs in the left col-
umn display the exponentiated values in levels. The right column shows the difference of the logarithm of the weekly 
wages between treatment and synthetic control groups along with placebo estimates for counties with prereform RMSPEs 
smaller than 2 times the prereform RMSPE of the treated state (gray lines). The left dashed vertical lines indicate when 
the law was passed, the middle solid vertical line indicates when the law became effective, and the right dashed vertical 
lines indicate when the probation period was over. In Connecticut, the treatment group consists of private sector firms 
with at least 50 employees; in Oregon and Massachusetts, the treatment group consists of private sector firms with at least 
10 employees. For more information about the sick pay reforms, see Table 1. Source: QCEW (Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(BLS), 2018), own calculation and illustration.











San Francisco, CA SF Nov 7, 2006 Feb 5, 2007 all employees including part-time and temporary; 1 hour of paid sick leave for every 30 hours worked;
up to 5 to 9 days depending on firm size; for own sickness or family member; 90 days accrual period
Washington, DC DC May 13, 2008 Nov 13, 2008 ’qualified employees’; 1 hour of paid sick leave for every 43 hours, 90 days accrual period;
up to 3 to 9 days depend. on firm size; own sickness or family; no health care or restaurant workers
Dec 18, 2013 Feb 22, 2014 extension to 20,000 temporary workers and tipped employees
(retrosp. in Sep 2014)
Connecticut July 1, 2011 Jan 1, 2012 full-time service sector employees in firms>49 employees (20% of workforce); 1 hour for every 40 hours;
up to 5 days; own sickness or family member, 680 hours accrual period (4 months)
Seattle, WA King Sep 12, 2011 Sep 1, 2012 all employees in firms with >4 full-time employees; 1 hour for every 30 or 40 hours worked;
up to 5 to 13 days depending on firm size, for own sickness or family member; 180 days accrual period
New York, NY Bronx, Kings, June 26, 2013 April 1, 2014 employees w >80 hours p.a in firms >4 employees or 1 domestic worker; 1 hour for every 30 hours;
New York, Queens, Jan 17, 2014 extended up to 40 hours; own sickness or family member; 120 days accrual period
Richmond
Portland, OR Multnomah March 13, 2013 Jan 1 2014 employees w >250 hours p.a. in firms >5 employees; 1 hour for every 30 hours;
up to 40 hours; own sickness or family member
Jersey City, NJ Hudson Sep 26, 2013 Jan 22, 2014 all employees in private firms with >9 employees; 1 hour for every 30 hours;
Oct 28, 2015 extended up to 40 hours; own sickness or family; 90 days accrual period
Newark, NJ Essex Jan 29, 2014 May 29, 2014 all employees in private companies; 1 hour for every 30 hours; 90 days accrual period;
up to 24 to 40 hours depending on size; own sickness or family
Philadelphia, PA Philadelphia Feb 12, 2015 May 13, 2015 all employees in firms >9 employees; 1 hour for every 40 hours;
up to 40 hours; own sickness or family member; 90 days accrual period
California September 19, 2014 July 1, 2015 all employees; 1 hour of paid sick leave for every 30 hours;
minimum 24 hours; own sickness or family member; 90 days accrual period
Massachusetts Nov 4, 2014 July 1, 2015 all employees in firms >10 employees; 1 hour for every 40 hours;
up to 40 hours; own sickness or family member; 90 days accrual period
Oakland, CA Alameda Nov 4, 2014 March 2, 2015 all employees in firms >9 employees; 1 hour for every 30 hours; 90 days accrual period;
up to 40 to 72 hours depending on firm size; own sickness or family member
Oregon June 22, 2015 Jan 1, 2016 all employees in firms >9 employees; 1 hour for every 30 hours; 90 days accrual period;
up to 40 hours; own sickness or family member
Source: several sources, own collection, own illustration.
Table 2: Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW), County Level: 2001-2016Q2
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Private sector, employment 0.271 0.136 0.011 4.038 548,992
Production sector 0.078 0.064 0 3.569 548,992
Construction 0.015 0.014 0 1.355
Manufacturing 0.045 0.046 0 3.482 548,992
Service sector 0.191 0.11 0 2.989 548,992
Trade, transportation, and utilities 0.066 0.032 0 0.966
Professional and business services 0.023 0.047 0 2.855 548,992
Education and health services employment 0.041 0.028 0 0.44 548,992
Leisure and hospitality employment 0.033 0.04 0 1.592 548,992
Public sector, employment 0.077 0.036 0.012 0.496 548,992
Private sector wages 599 182 155 4542 182,992
Population 82,799 240,169 258 8,495,194 44,267
Source: QCEW (Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), 2018), own calculation and illustration. U.S. Census Bureau (2016b)
provided the county-level population data.
Table 3: Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW), State Level: 2001-2016Q2
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Private sector, employment 0.373 0.061 0.268 0.791 8,981
Production sector 0.073 0.02 0.014 0.141 8,981
Construction 0.023 0.007 0 0.059 8,981
Manufacturing 0.043 0.019 0 0.107 8,981
Service sector 0.297 0.061 0.179 0.765 8,981
Trade, transportation, and utilities 0.086 0.011 0.042 0.145 8,981
Professional and business services 0.055 0.026 0.027 0.26 8,981
Education and health services employment 0.062 0.018 0.031 0.173 8,981
Leisure and hospitality employment 0.048 0.016 0.03 0.148 8,981
Public sector, employment 0.08 0.041 0.044 0.414 8,981
Private sector wages 805 199 440 1624 2,992
Population 5,573,357 5,728,342 494,657 39,144,818 721
Private service sector empl., >49 empl. 0.152 0.051 0.047 0.557 8,981
Private non-service sector empl., >49 empl. 0.045 0.016 0.006 0.098 8,981
Private sector empl., >9 empl. 0.312 0.056 0.21 0.696 8,981
Private service sector wages, >49 empl. 839.829 263.662 423.173 2030.237 8,981
Private sector wages, >9 empl. 815.594 190.141 454.512 1667.3 8,981
Source: QCEW (Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), 2018), own calculation and illustration. U.S. Census Bureau (2016b)
provided the state-level population data.


























San Francisco,CA 0.5742 0.0133 0.0536 4.0429 35/164=0.2134 0.0518 0.0298 0.4329 0.5854
King County, WA 0.5040 0.0055 0.0083 1.5041 89/155=0.5742 0.0058 0.0031 0.0323 0.1613
New York City,NY 0.3835 0.0041 0.0146 3.5908 23/175=0.1314 -0.0062 -0.0030 0.0171 0.0343
Multnomah, OR 0.4852 0.0061 0.0141 2.3237 61/185=0.3297 0.0131 0.0068 0.0541 0.1784
Essex County, NJ 0.3319 0.0147 0.0256 1.7445 85/158=0.538 -0.0232 -0.0078 0.4241 0.6139
Hudson County, NJ 0.2965 0.0267 0.0438 1.6393 41/83=0.494 -0.0419 -0.0132 0.6747 0.8795
Philadelphia, PA 0.3436 0.0081 0.0119 1.4800 79/175=0.4514 -0.0072 -0.0026 0.0514 0.1771
Alameda, CA 0.3638 0.0081 0.0081 0.9984 139/199=0.6985 0.0055 0.0021 0.0754 0.1960
District of Columbia 0.7752 0.1395 0.1902 1.3638 114/161
Average / Sum Pval 2.0764 4.1387 -0.0003 0.0019 1.762 2.8259
P val Irwin Hall 0.3407 0.0023 0.0765
B. States (only treated firm sizes & industry):
Connecticut (service sector, 50+) 0.1746 0.0076 0.0235 3.0716 9/47=0.1915 -0.0214 -0.0038 0.1489 0.2340
California 0.3376 0.0056 0.0080 1.4369 24/47=0.5106 0.0069 0.0025 0.0213 0.0638
Massachusetts (10+) 0.3628 0.0041 0.0042 1.0184 36/47=0.766 0.0008 0.0005 0.0213 0.0213
Oregon (10+) 0.2932 0.0069 0.0086 1.2425 26/47=0.5532 0.0082 0.0026 0.0638 0.1702
Average / Sum Pval 1.6923 2.0213 -0.0014 0.0005 0.2553 0.4893
P val Irwin Hall 0.5142 0.0002 0.0024
Total (Counties and States):
Average / Sum Pval 2.0078 5.4519 -0.0006 0.0014 2.0173 3.3152
P val Irwin Hall 0.2940 0 0.0031
Source: QCEW (Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), 2018), own calculation and illustration. All statistics displayed here are discussed in Section 5. Column (1)
displays the outcome measure in levels for each treated county averaged over all prereform years. Columns (2) and (3) display the RMSPE as in Equation (3)
for pre and postreform years, respectively. Column (4) displays the RMSPE Ratio [RMSPE post/RMSPE pre]. Column (5) calculates the p-value of the RMSPE
Ratio for all treated counties using the indicated number of placebo estimates. Columns (6) and (7) show the PTE and LTE as in Equations (4) and (5). Columns
(8) and (9) display the p-values of rejecting the null of no treatment effect after assigning hypothetical employment decreases of 3% and 2% (see main text for
details). As for the joint tests and sum of all p-values, we exclude the District of Columbia due to a poor prereform RMSPE fit (values in cells are intentionally
left blank). For more information, see the discussion on treatment regions in Section 4. For more information about the sick pay reforms, see Table 1.


























San Francisco,CA 1434.71 0.0423 0.0389 0.9201 144/164=0.878 0.0089 11.6254 0.8049 0.8598
King County, WA 1199.26 0.0207 0.0446 2.1524 28/155=0.1806 0.0296 38.9481 0.1806 0.2839
New York City,NY 2054.66 0.1146 0.0937 0.8183 153/175
Multnomah, OR 927.31 0.0083 0.0182 2.2004 35/185=0.1892 0.0039 4.3896 0.0162 0.0703
Essex County, NJ 1261.09 0.0160 0.0162 1.0101 112/158=0.7089 -0.0054 -7.3773 0.2152 0.3671
Hudson County, NJ 1579.94 0.1857 0.1675 0.9018 66/83
Philadelphia, PA 1153.10 0.0104 0.0141 1.3589 69/175=0.3943 0.0077 9.2885 0.0629 0.1543
Alameda, CA 1231.76 0.0308 0.0546 1.7728 60/199=0.3015 0.0542 70.8706 0.6633 0.8794
District of Columbia 1320.95 0.0203 0.0146 0.7221 151/161=0.9379 -0.0021 -4.7810 0.2857 0.5280
Average / Sum Pval 1.3174 4.3220 0.0138 17.5663 2.2288 3.1428
P val Irwin Hall 0.6507 0.0483 0.3234
B. States (only treated firm sizes & industry):
Connecticut (service sector, 50+) 1503.8880 0.0190 0.0209 1.0986 32/47=0.6809 0.0150 23.9702 0.4043 0.6383
California 1106.7480 0.0229 0.0441 1.9251 12/47=0.2553 0.0439 51.8478 0.5319 0.7660
Massachusetts (10+) 1260.1960 0.0706 0.0800 1.1335 22/47=0.4681 0.0718 96.0367 0.9149 0.9574
Oregon (10+) 918.6851 0.0127 0.0189 1.4880 10/47=0.2128 0.0171 17.7307 0.1277 0.1702
Average / Sum Pval 1.4113 1.6171 0.0369 47.3964 1.9788 2.5319
P val Irwin Hall 0.2608 0.4859 0.8144
Total (Counties and States):
Average / Sum Pval 1.3983 5.2075 0.0222 28.4136 4.2076 5.6747
P val Irwin Hall 0.3815 0.0897 0.5714
Source: QCEW (Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), 2018), own calculation and illustration. All statistics displayed here are discussed in Section 5. Column (1) displays the
outcome measure in levels for each treated county averaged over all prereform years. Columns (2) and (3) display the RMSPE as in Equation (3) for pre and postreform
years, respectively. Column (4) displays the RMSPE Ratio [RMSPE post/RMSPE pre]. Column (5) calculates the p-value of the RMSPE Ratio for all treated counties using
the indicated number of placebo estimates. Columns (6) and (7) show the PTE and LTE as in Equations (4) and (5). Columns (8) and (9) display the p-values of rejecting
the null of no treatment effect after assigning hypothetical weekly wage decreases of 3% and 2% (see main text for details). As for the joint tests and sum of all p-values,
we exclude New York City and Hudson County due to a poor prereform RMSPE fit (values in cells are intentionally left blank). For more information, see the discussion
on treatment regions in Section 4. For more information about the sick pay reforms, see Table 1.
Table 6: Traditional DD Models—Effect of Mandates on Employment and Wages at the County Level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
A. Employment

























Month/quarter-year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
County fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
State time trends (linear) yes yes yes yes
Log Public Sector + Log Pop yes yes yes yes
Source: QCEW (Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), 2018), own calculation and illustration; * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01;
standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the county level. Each column in each panel represents one model, esti-
mated by OLS. TreatedCounty is a treatment indicator which is one for all counties listed in Table 1. LawEffectiveTime,
LawPassedTime and ProbationOverTime are linear time trends that start when the law is effective (2), when the law is
passed (4) and when probation is over (6). The models in Panel A use the logarithm of the population share of private
sector employees as dependent variable. The models in Panel B use the logarithm of weekly wages as dependent variable.
All models in Panel A have 548,992 employment-month observations and all models in Panel B have 182,992 wage-quarter
observations. All regressions contain month-of-year (Panel A) or quarter-year (Panel B) fixed effects and county fixed
effects as in Equation (6). The descriptive statistics of the baseline sample used here is in Table 2.
Online Appendix
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Hudson County, New Jersey
Note: The left column compares treated counties (solid line) to the synthetic control counties (dashed line). All SCGM analyses are in
logs; graphs in the left column display the exponentiated values in levels. The right column shows the difference of the logarithm of
the employment ratios between treated and control groups along with placebo estimates for counties with prereform RMSPEs smaller
than 2 times the prereform RMSPE of the treated county (gray lines). The left dashed vertical lines indicate when the law was passed,
the middle solid vertical lines indicate when the law became effective, and the right dashed vertical lines indicate when the probation
period was over. For more information about the sick pay reforms, see Table 1. Source: QCEW (Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), 2018),
own calculation and illustration.
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Hudson County, New Jersey
Note: The left column compares treated counties (solid line) to the synthetic control counties (dashed line). All SCGM analyses are in
logs; graphs in the left column display the exponentiated values in levels. The right column shows the difference of the logarithm of
the employment ratios between treated and control groups along with placebo estimates for counties with prereform RMSPEs smaller
than 2 times the prereform RMSPE of the treated county (gray lines). The left dashed vertical lines indicate when the law was passed,
the middle solid vertical lines indicate when the law became effective, and the right dashed vertical lines indicate when the probation
period was over. For more information about the sick pay reforms, see Table 1. Source: QCEW (Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), 2018),
own calculation and illustration.
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Hudson County, New Jersey
Note: The black dashed lines select synthetic control counties based on additional industry-structure variables (Tables 2 and 3). The 
gray solid lines use six instead of four pretreatment years; the gray dashed lines use six instead of four years but stops applying the 
SGCM algorithm two years before the law’s enactment. The light gray solid lines use the outcome in levels, relative to T-1 (the period 
before the law’s enactment). For more information about the sick pay reforms, see Table 1. Source: QCEW (Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(BLS), 2018), own calculation and illustration.































































-48 -36 -24 -12 0 12 24 36
Months to/from treatment
NewYork synthetic NewYork















-48 -36 -24 -12 0 12 24 36
Months to/from treatment































































-48 -36 -24 -12 0 12 24 36
Months to/from treatment
NewYork synthetic NewYork















-48 -36 -24 -12 0 12 24 36
Months to/from treatment
New York City, New York
Note: The left column compares treated counties (solid lines) to the synthetic control counties (dashed lines). All SCGM analyses are
in logs; graphs in the left column display the exponentiated values in levels. The right column shows the difference of the logarithm of
the employment ratios and the weekly wage between treated and synthetic control groups along with placebo estimates for counties
with prereform RMSPEs smaller than 2 times the prereform RMSPE of the treated county (gray lines). The left dashed vertical lines
indicate when the law was passed, the middle solid vertical lines indicate when the law became effective, and the right dashed vertical
lines indicate when the probation period was over. Table A4 shows the according statistics. For more information about the sick pay
reforms, see Table 1. Source: QCEW (Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), 2018), own calculation and illustration.
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Essex County, New Jersey
Note: The left column compares treated counties (solid lines) to the synthetic control counties (dashed lines). All SCGM analyses are
in logs; graphs in the left column display the exponentiated values in levels. The right column shows the difference of the logarithm of
the employment ratios and the weekly wage between treated and synthetic control groups along with placebo estimates for counties
with prereform RMSPEs smaller than 2 times the prereform RMSPE of the treated county (gray lines). The left dashed vertical lines
indicate when the law was passed, the middle solid vertical lines indicate when the law became effective, and the right dashed vertical
lines indicate when the probation period was over. Table A4 shows the according statistics. For more information about the sick pay
reforms, see Table 1. Source: QCEW (Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), 2018), own calculation and illustration.
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New York City, New York
Note: The left column compares treated counties (solid lines) to the synthetic control counties (dashed lines). All SCGM analyses are
in logs; graphs in the left column display the exponentiated values in levels. The right column shows the difference of the logarithm
of the employment ratios and the weekly wage between treated and control groups along with placebo estimates for counties with
prereform RMSPEs smaller than 2 times the prereform RMSPE of the treated county (gray lines). The left dashed vertical lines indicate
when the law was passed, the middle solid vertical lines indicate when the law became effective, and the right dashed vertical lines
indicate when the probation period was over. Table A4 shows the according statistics. For more information about the sick pay
reforms, see Table 1. Source: QCEW (Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), 2018), own calculation and illustration.
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Essex County, New Jersey
Note: The left column compares treated counties (solid lines) to the synthetic control counties (dashed lines). All SCGM analyses are
in logs; graphs in the left column display the exponentiated values in levels. The right column shows the difference of the logarithm of
the employment ratios and the weekly wage between treated and synthetic control groups along with placebo estimates for counties
with prereform RMSPEs smaller than 2 times the prereform RMSPE of the treated county (gray lines). The left dashed vertical lines
indicate when the law was passed, the middle solid vertical lines indicate when the law became effective, and the right dashed vertical
lines indicate when the probation period was over. Table A4 shows the according statistics. For more information about the sick pay
reforms, see Table 1. Source: QCEW (Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), 2018), own calculation and illustration.


















































































6 pre years 6 pre, first 4
levels, diff T-1
Note: The lines always show the differences between treated and controls. The solid black line shows our standard mod-
eling approach as shown in the right column of Figure 7. The black dashed lines select synthetic control counties based on 
additional industry-structure variables (Tables 2 and 3). The gray solid lines use six instead of four pretreatment years; 
the gray dashed line uses six instead of four years but stops applying the SGCM algorithm two years before the law’s 
enactment. The light gray solid lines use employment in levels, relative to employment in T-1 (the period before the law’s 
enactment) instead of the employment as a share of the population. The left dashed vertical lines indicate when the law 
was passed, the middle solid vertical lines indicates when the law became effective, and the right dashed vertical lines 
indicate when the probation period was over. In Connecticut, the treatment group consists of private sector firms with 
at least 50 employees; in Oregon and Massachusetts, the treatment group consists of private sector firms with at least 10 
employees. For more information about the sick pay reforms, see Table 1. Source: QCEW (Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), 
2018), own calculation and illustration.






































































6 pre years 6 pre, first 4
levels, diff T-1
Note: The solid black line shows our standard modeling approach as shown in the right column of Figure 8. The black 
dashed lines select synthetic control counties based on additional industry-structure variables (Tables 2 and 3). The gray 
solid lines use six instead of four pretreatment years; the gray dashed lines use six instead of four years but stops applying 
the SGCM algorithm two years before the law’s enactment. The light gray solid lines use wages in levels, relative to wages 
in T-1 (the period before the law’s enactment). The left dashed vertical lines indicate when the law was passed, the middle 
solid vertical lines indicate when the law became effective, and the right dashed vertical lines indicate when the probation 
period was over. In Connecticut, the treatment group consists of private sector firms with at least 50 employees; in Oregon 
and Massachusetts, the treatment group consists of private sector firms with at least 10 e mployees. For more information 
about the sick pay reforms, see Table 1. Source: QCEW (Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), 2018), own calculation and 
illustration.
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Connecticut
Note: The left column compares Connecticut (solid line) to the synthetic control state (dashed line). All SCGM analyses
are in logs; graphs in the left column display the exponentiated values in levels. The right column shows the difference of
the logarithms of the outcome variable between Connecticut and the synthetic control state along with placebo estimates
(gray lines). The left dashed vertical lines indicate when the law was passed, the middle solid vertical lines indicate when
the law became effective, and the right dashed vertical lines indicate when the probation period was over. Table A4 shows
the according statistics. For more information about the sick pay reforms, see Table 1. Source: QCEW (Bureau of Labor
Statistics (BLS), 2018), own calculation and illustration.
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California
Note: The left column compares California (solid line) to the synthetic control state (dashed line). All SCGM analyses
are in logs; graphs in the left column display the exponentiated values in levels. The right column shows the differ-
ence of the logarithms of the outcome variable between California and the synthetic control state along with placebo
estimates (gray lines). The left dashed vertical lines indicate when the law was passed, the middle solid vertical lines
indicate when the law became effective, and the right dashed vertical lines indicate when the probation period was
over. Table A4 shows the according statistics. For more information about the sick pay reforms, see Table 1. Source:
QCEW (Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), 2018), own calculation and illustration.
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Massachusetts
Note: The left column compares Massachusetts (solid line) to the synthetic control state (dashed line). All SCGM
analyses are in logs; graphs in the left column display the exponentiated values in levels. The right column shows
the difference of the logarithms of the outcome variable between Massachusetts and the synthetic control state along
with placebo estimates (gray lines). The left dashed vertical lines indicate when the law was passed, the middle solid
vertical lines indicate when the law became effective, and the right dashed vertical lines indicate when the probation
period was over. Table A4 shows the according statistics. For more information about the sick pay reforms, see Table
1. Source: QCEW (Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), 2018), own calculation and illustration.




































































































































































-48 -36 -24 -12 0 12 24 36
Months to/from treatment
Oregon
Note: The left column compares Oregon (solid line) to the synthetic control state (dashed line). All SCGM analyses are in
logs; graphs in the left column display the exponentiated values in levels. The right column shows the difference of the
logarithms of the outcome variable between Oregon and the synthetic control group along with placebo estimates (gray
lines). The left dashed vertical lines indicate when the law was passed, the middle solid vertical lines indicate when the
law became effective, and the right dashed vertical lines indicate when the probation period was over. Table A4 shows
the according statistics. For more information about the sick pay reforms, see Table 1. Source: QCEW (Bureau of Labor
Statistics (BLS), 2018), own calculation and illustration.
Table A1: Counties for Synthetic Control Group—Employment
San King NYC Multnomah Essex Hudson Philadelphia Alameda DC
Francisco (WA) (NY) (OR) (NJ) (NJ) (PA) (CA) (DC)
Arlington, VA 0.308 0.000 0.085 0.000 a a a 0.000 0.481
Montgomery, MD 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.539 0.000 0.267 0.000 0
Fulton, GA 0.218 0.001 0.000 0.000 a a a 0.000 0.519
Somerset, NJ 0.474 0.082 0.000 0.000 a a 0.000 0.157 0
DeKalb, GA a a 0.000 a 0.000 0.000 0.667 0.000 a
Miami-Dade, FL a a 0.56 a 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 a
Douglas, CO a a a a 0.000 0.551 0.000 a a
Westchester, NY 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.265 0.000 0.191 0
Williamson, TN 0.000 0.000 0.355 0.082 0.000 a 0.000 0.000 0
Mecklenburg, NC 0.000 0.402 0.000 0.000 a a a 0.000 0
El Paso, CO a a a a 0.262 0.000 0.000 0.000 a
Rutherford, TN 0.000 a 0.000 a 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.245 a
Durham, NC 0.000 0.132 0.000 0.064 a a a 0.000 0
Ada, ID 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.189 0.000 a 0.000 0.000 0
Collin, TX a a 0.000 a 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.187 a
St. Mary’s, MD a a a a a 0.184 a a a
Polk, IA 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.175 a a a 0.000 0
Albany, NY 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.149 a a a 0.000 0
Kent, MI 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.139 a a a 0.000 0
Denver, CO 0.000 0.123 0.000 0.000 a a a 0.000 0
Benton, AR 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 a 0.000 0.101 0
Strafford, NH a a a a 0.095 0.000 0.000 a a
Madison, AL 0.000 0.093 0.000 0.000 0.000 a 0.000 0.000 0
Albemarle, VA a a a a 0.089 0.000 0.000 0.000 a
Travis, TX 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.057 0.000 a 0.000 0.029 0
Washtenaw, MI 0.000 a 0.000 0.000 0.015 0.000 0.000 0.057 a
Fairfax, VA 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 a 0.065 0.000 0
Harris, TX 0.000 0.063 0.000 0.000 0.000 a 0.000 0.000 0
Johnson, KS 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.061 a a a 0.000 0
Lake, IL 0.000 0.04 0.000 0.000 0.000 a 0.000 0.000 0
Sangamon, IL a a a 0.036 a a a a a
Midland, TX 0.000 0.036 0.000 0.000 a a a 0.000 0
Cass, ND a 0.000 0.000 0.035 a a a 0.000 a
Ascension, LA a a a a 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.026 a
Winnebago, WI 0.000 0.018 0.000 0.000 a a 0.000 0.000 0
Fayette, KY 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.013 0.000 a 0.000 0.000 0
Mercer, NJ 0.000 0.01 0.000 0.000 0.000 a 0.000 0.000 0
San Juan, NM a a a a 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.006 a
... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Note: The table shows the vector of weights W that minimizes the RMSPE (see Equation [2]) for all treated counties
and log employment rate as dependent variable. These weights are used to construct the synthetic control counties in
Figure 1 and Figure A1. The weights are also used to calculate the indicators in Table 4. ’a’ indicates that the values for
employment, wages, and county population do not lie within the region of support of the treatment county. Thus these
counties are not considered as potential “donors.” ’0’ indicates that the county is a potential control county donor but has
not actually been used as a donor. ... represents the missing counties (out of a total of 3,062). All counties with positive
fractions indicate the donor share employed by the SCGM to replicate the treatment county in the column header. All
fractions in one column (including the non-displayed “...”) add to 100%. Source: QCEW (Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS),
2018), own calculation and illustration.
Table A2: Counties for Synthetic Control Groups—Weekly Wages
San King NYC Multnomah Essex Hudson Philadelphia Alameda DC
Francisco (WA) (NY) (OR) (NJ) (NJ) (PA) (CA) (DC)
Westchester, NY 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.251 0.874 0.264 0.332 0
Somerset, NJ 0.608 0.000 1 0.000 a a 0.000 0.089 0
Arlington, VA 0.392 0.051 0.000 0.000 a a a 0.000 0.739
DeKalb, GA a a 0.000 a 0.000 0.000 0.6 0.000 a
Montgomery, MD 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.457 0.000 0.03 0.000 0
Fulton, GA 0.000 0.169 0.000 0.000 a a a 0.000 0.261
Cass, ND a 0.089 0.000 0.166 a a a 0.000 a
Travis, TX 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.193 0.000 a 0.000 0.044 0
Harris, TX 0.000 0.227 0.000 0.000 0.000 a 0.000 0.000 0
Polk, IA 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.187 a a a 0.000 0
Macomb, MI a a a a 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.186 a
Lake, IL 0.000 0.157 0.000 0.000 0.000 a 0.000 0.000 0
Benton, AR 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 a 0.000 0.148 0
Douglas, CO a a a a 0.000 0.126 0.000 a a
Hunterdon, NJ a a a a 0.125 0.000 0.000 0.000 a
Montgomery, PA 0.000 0.117 0.000 0.000 a a a 0.000 0
Washtenaw, MI 0.000 a 0.000 0.048 0.063 0.000 0.000 0.000 a
Fairfax, VA 0.000 0.044 0.000 0.000 0.000 a 0.064 0.000 0
Mercer, NJ 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.04 a 0.000 0.061 0
San Juan, NM a a a a 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.097 a
Ada, ID 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.093 0.000 a 0.000 0.000 0
Anne Arundel, MD a 0.000 0.000 0.089 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 a
Steuben, NY a a a a 0.064 0.000 a a a
Durham, NC 0.000 0.048 0.000 0.015 a a a 0.000 0
Madison, AL 0.000 0.056 0.000 0.000 0.000 a 0.000 0.000 0
Albany, NY 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.055 a a a 0.000 0
Kent, MI 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.048 a a a 0.000 0
Orange, FL 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.043 a a a 0.000 0
Ascension, LA a a a a 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.042 a
Terrebonne, LA 0.000 0.042 0.000 0.000 0.000 a 0.000 0.000 0
Alexandria, VA 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 a a 0.042 0.000 0
Olmsted, MN 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.037 a a a 0.000 0
St. Louis, MO 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.023 a a a 0.000 0
Sangamon, IL a a a 0.003 a a a a a
Note: The table shows the vector of weights W that minimizes the RMSPE (see Equation [2]) for all treated counties and
log wages as dependent variable. These weights are used to construct the synthetic counties in Figure 2 and Figure A2.
The weights are also used to calculate the indicators in Table 5. ’a’ indicates that the values for employment, wages, and
county population do not lie within the region of support of the treatment county. Thus these counties are not considered
as potential “donors.” ’0 ’indicates that the county is a potential control county donor but has not actually been used as
a donor. All counties with positive fractions indicate the donor share employed by the SCGM for the treatment county
in the column header. Thus, all fractions in one column add to 100%. Source: QCEW (Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS),
2018), own calculation and illustration.
Table A3: Synthetic Control Group Method—Alternative Modeling Approaches










































San Francisco,CA 0.013 3.624 0.047 0.027 0.022 0.814 0.009 0.010 0.019 2.921 0.053 0.030 0.019 3.172 0.057 0.033
King County, WA 0.006 1.301 0.005 0.003 0.006 2.200 0.009 0.010 0.007 1.328 0.006 0.003 0.007 3.170 0.020 0.010
New York City,NY 0.009 0.940 -0.001 -0.001 0.070 0.259 0.011 0.012 0.024 2.014 0.048 0.020 0.029 2.503 0.072 0.029
Multnomah, OR 0.008 1.947 0.014 0.008 0.008 0.724 0.003 0.003 0.015 0.926 0.013 0.007 0.018 2.008 0.034 0.018
Essex County, NJ 0.012 1.567 -0.016 -0.005 0.023 0.528 0.001 0.002 0.011 1.903 -0.020 -0.007 0.028 2.118 -0.057 -0.019
Hudson County, NJ 0.008 5.750 0.042 0.013 0.010 2.319 0.015 0.016 0.010 1.444 0.003 0.001 0.018 1.187 -0.014 -0.004
Philadelphia, PA 0.011 1.787 -0.017 -0.006 0.026 0.562 -0.012 -0.012 0.010 1.072 -0.005 -0.002 0.013 1.916 -0.024 -0.009
Alameda, CA 0.007 0.825 0.002 0.001 0.007 1.354 -0.008 -0.008 0.012 0.649 0.006 0.002 0.016 2.731 0.044 0.017
District of Columbia 0.051 2.419 0.010 1.424 0.044 2.732 0.050 2.725
Average Counties 2.240 0.009 0.005 1.132 0.004 0.004 1.666 0.013 0.007 2.392 0.016 0.009
Connecticut 0.008 2.930 -0.023 -0.004 0.005 4.307 -0.020 -0.020 0.007 3.536 -0.022 -0.004 0.006 4.498 -0.028 -0.005
California 0.010 0.551 0.003 0.001 0.007 1.910 0.012 0.013 0.007 0.936 0.004 0.002 0.007 1.808 0.012 0.004
Massachusetts 0.004 1.189 0.003 0.001 0.003 1.780 0.003 0.004 0.005 0.762 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.840 -0.003 -0.001
Oregon 0.008 0.417 -0.003 -0.001 0.008 0.309 -0.002 -0.002 0.008 0.937 0.008 0.002 0.009 2.222 0.019 0.006
Average States 1.272 -0.005 -0.001 2.076 -0.002 -0.001 1.543 -0.003 0.000 2.342 0.000 0.001
Average C. & States 1.942 0.005 0.003 1.422 0.002 0.002 1.628 0.008 0.005 2.377 0.011 0.007
B. Wages
San Francisco,CA 0.042 0.920 0.009 11.625 0.054 1.044 -0.045 -0.045 0.053 0.722 0.000 -3.785 0.054 0.716 0.006 6.755
King County, WA 0.023 1.857 0.025 32.831 0.040 0.992 -0.028 -0.029 0.020 2.971 0.050 66.726 0.026 3.450 0.083 109.085
New York City,NY 0.115 0.818 0.102 0.796 0.112 0.855 0.119 0.869
Multnomah, OR 0.019 1.117 -0.011 -10.324 0.005 3.383 -0.004 -0.004 0.007 2.459 -0.005 -4.770 0.010 2.964 0.016 17.279
Essex County, NJ 0.019 1.378 0.001 0.929 0.017 0.906 -0.008 -0.009 0.016 1.141 -0.013 -17.412 0.022 0.890 -0.015 -19.666
Hudson County, NJ 0.162 0.920 0.033 0.879 0.013 0.014 0.187 0.892 0.162 0.923
Philadelphia, PA 0.015 1.190 0.017 20.389 0.014 1.124 -0.002 -0.002 0.019 1.604 0.026 30.966 0.029 1.140 0.025 30.197
Alameda, CA 0.039 1.371 0.054 69.464 0.009 1.645 0.012 0.013 0.026 1.802 0.046 60.720 0.018 1.323 0.014 21.215
District of Columbia 0.019 0.861 -0.006 -10.867 0.023 0.495 -0.002 -0.002 0.018 0.845 -0.003 -6.370 0.019 0.815 0.007 9.007
Average Counties 1.159 0.013 16.292 1.252 -0.008 -0.008 1.477 0.014 18.011 1.454 0.019 24.839
Connecticut 0.047 1.173 0.054 84.235 0.019 1.092 0.017 0.018 0.020 0.755 0.005 6.995 0.038 1.188 0.043 67.718
California 0.009 2.227 0.019 22.730 0.015 0.871 0.011 0.012 0.011 1.710 0.017 21.390 0.020 2.003 0.039 45.964
Massachusetts 0.044 1.058 0.028 39.663 0.020 1.144 0.015 0.015 0.063 1.196 0.068 90.488 0.079 1.153 0.084 111.697
Oregon 0.022 1.593 0.034 34.088 0.014 1.364 0.018 0.018 0.015 1.749 0.026 25.595 0.015 2.731 0.041 39.843
Average States 1.513 0.034 45.179 1.118 0.015 0.016 1.352 0.029 36.117 1.769 0.052 66.306
Average C. & States 1.268 0.020 26.797 1.210 0.000 0.000 1.438 0.020 24.595 1.551 0.031 39.918
Note: All statistics displayed here are discussed in Section 5. Panel A shows the statistics for employment and Panel B shows the statistics for wages. The first four columns 
show the results when using additional industry-structure controls in the SCGM algorithm (see lower part of Tables 2 and 3). The next four columns show the results when 
implementing the SCGM on differences in the dependent variable from the period T-1, before the enactment of the mandate. Columns (9) to (12) show the results when using 
six instead of four years of pretreatment data for each treated region. And columns (13) to (16) use six pretreatment years but stop applying the minimization algorithm two 
years before the enactment of the mandate. The analogous figures are in Figures 3, A3, A8, and A 9. Source: QCEW (Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), 2018), own calculation and 
illustration.



























SF, CA 0.022 0.044 2.422 0.474 0.087 0.094 0.032 3.135 0.085 0.099
King County, WA 0.026 0.080 1.834 0.445 0.143 0.056 0.013 1.161 0.684 0.005
NYC, NY 0.013 0.025 0.983 0.749 0.018 0.042 0.021 1.898 0.229 0.037
Multnomah, OR 0.022 0.037 1.736 0.400 -0.007 0.064 0.017 2.127 0.211 0.033
Essex County, NJ 0.010 0.027 1.816 0.413 -0.033 0.030 0.043 1.471 0.373 0.047
Hudson County, NJ 0.006 0.468 0.823 0.025 0.029 1.987
Philadelphia, PA 0.006 0.306 0.871 0.041 0.020 1.422
Alameda, CA 0.022 0.043 0.407 0.984 0.015 0.039 0.014 0.978 0.613 0.005
DC 0.022 0.082 1.927 0.612 -0.129 0.096 0.037 3.283 0.062 0.117
All Counties 1.424 4.077 0.037 1.940 2.710 0.033
P-Val Irwin Hall 0.771 0.019
CT (service sector, 50+) 0.002 not treated 0.012 0.136 1.646
CA 0.016 0.031 1.185 0.596 0.033 0.043 0.011 1.334 0.298 0.012
MA (10+) 0.011 0.033 1.858 0.297 -0.001 0.044 0.026 1.164 0.383 0.023
OR (10+) 0.012 0.027 2.999 0.148 0.070 0.038 0.027 0.901 0.659 0.021
All States 2.014 1.043 0.034 1.261 1.341 0.018
P-Val Irwin Hall 0.189 0.382
County & State 1.539 5.407 0.020 1.731 4.051 0.037
P-Val Irwin Hall 0.462 0.025
B. Wages
SF, CA 1166 0.055 2.260 0.260 0.118 476 0.026 1.426 0.439 0.032
King County, WA 1133 0.019 0.454 0.993 0.004 439 0.012 6.267 0.007 0.064
NYC, NY 1294 0.011 2.078 0.240 -0.020 671 0.062 1.235 0.566 0.068
Multnomah, OR 1123 0.032 2.010 0.291 -0.055 402 0.053 0.801 0.854 0.032
Essex County, NJ 1137 0.030 0.946 0.780 0.015 482 0.059 2.156 0.196 0.118
Hudson County, NJ 1270 0.032 2.677 0.075 0.085 425 0.027 0.980 0.675 0.008
Philadelphia, PA 1257 0.022 1.173 0.581 0.024 533 0.042 1.086 0.623 0.036
Alameda, CA 1315 0.014 2.980 0.064 0.037 460 0.052 2.726 0.075 0.133
DC 981 0.142 0.900 562 0.229 1.012
All Counties 1.720 3.283 0.026 1.965 3.434 0.061
P-Val Irwin Hall 0.193 0.248
CT (service sector, 50+) 1489 not treated 417 0.021 1.242 0.425 -0.001
CA 1069 0.009 1.973 0.128 0.015 448 0.017 1.029 0.723 0.015
MA (10+) 1424 0.101 0.763 444 0.070 1.215
OR (10+) 1145 0.016 1.115 0.425 0.007 363 0.026 1.367 0.319 -0.020
All States 1.284 0.553 0.011 1.203 2.000 0.019
P-Val Irwin Hall 0.153 0.500
County & State 1.611 3.836 0.023 1.775 5.434 0.047
P-Val Irwin Hall 0.103 0.288
Note: All statistics displayed are discussed in Section 5. Panel A shows the statistics for employment and Panel B
shows the statistics for wages. Blank cells indicate a poor pre-RMSPE fit; those regions are not included in joint tests.
The first five columns show the results for the construction sector and the last five columns show the results for the
hospitality and leisure sector. The analogous figures are in Figures 5, A3, A8, and A9. Source: QCEW (Bureau of Labor
Statistics (BLS), 2018), own calculation and illustration.
Table A5: Test for Spillover Effects on Neighboring Counties of Treated Counties
Employment Wages
RMSPE RMSPE RMSPE RMSPE
















Marin, CA San Francisco, CA 0.012 4.446 -0.048 -0.018 0.035 1.483 -0.042 -45.996
San Mateo, CA San Francisco, CA 0.013 1.339 0.006 0.002 0.046 1.729 0.011 19.600
Alameda, CA San Francisco, CA 0.009 1.926 -0.001 -0.001 0.015 1.029 0.011 12.530
Contra Costa, CA San Francisco, CA 0.010 7.453 -0.066 -0.019 0.020 2.072 0.008 8.397
Kitsap, WA King, WA 0.009 1.559 -0.006 -0.001 0.009 2.935 0.025 17.082
Pierce, WA King, WA 0.012 1.067 0.010 0.003 0.010 1.289 0.003 2.588
Kittitas, WA King, WA 0.035 0.922 0.006 0.001 0.012 2.170 0.014 7.722
Chelan, WA King, WA 0.080 1.114 0.055 0.027 0.014 1.443 0.016 10.255
Snohomish, WA King, WA 0.012 2.434 -0.016 -0.005 0.029 1.468 0.032 34.551
Nassau, NY Bronx, NY 0.011 1.119 -0.004 -0.002 0.036 1.513 0.050 53.508
Westchester, NY Bronx, NY 0.008 1.257 0.001 0.000 0.014 1.431 0.002 4.034
Rockland, NY Bronx, NY 0.007 2.470 0.015 0.005 0.018 4.088 -0.019 -16.899
Clark, WA Multnomah, OR 0.007 1.593 0.007 0.002 0.010 1.193 0.000 0.447
Columbia, OR Multnomah, OR 0.023 2.255 0.044 0.008 0.013 1.785 0.010 6.694
WA, OR Multnomah, OR 0.006 2.452 0.003 0.001 0.020 2.866 0.037 51.031
Clackamas, OR Multnomah, OR 0.010 1.499 0.007 0.002 0.015 1.360 0.005 5.878
Hood River, OR Multnomah, OR 0.117 1.545 0.162 0.079 0.024 2.833 0.063 38.859
Skamania, WA Multnomah, OR 0.054 1.935 0.096 0.012 0.031 1.225 -0.016 -8.690
Bergen, NJ Essex, NJ 0.010 1.138 -0.007 -0.003 0.019 1.724 -0.029 -37.681
Passaic, NJ Essex, NJ 0.012 4.515 -0.052 -0.014 0.021 1.183 0.009 9.264
Union, NJ Essex, NJ 0.017 3.807 -0.061 -0.022 0.028 1.541 0.034 44.881
Bergen, NJ Hudson, NJ 0.012 1.155 -0.009 -0.004 0.023 0.758 0.013 16.034
Passaic, NJ Hudson, NJ 0.011 5.103 -0.054 -0.015 0.015 1.205 -0.003 -2.216
Morris, NJ Hudson, NJ 0.012 0.509 0.000 0.000 0.020 1.695 0.025 42.492
Union, NJ Hudson, NJ 0.010 6.634 -0.059 -0.021 0.024 2.116 0.037 52.706
Bucks, PA Philadelphia, PA 0.007 0.913 -0.001 -0.001 0.009 1.202 -0.008 -8.441
Montgomery, PA Philadelphia, PA 0.009 0.620 -0.002 -0.001 0.017 0.639 0.004 4.196
Delaware, PA Philadelphia, PA 0.009 1.838 -0.015 -0.005 0.012 1.398 0.010 11.671
Burlington, NJ Philadelphia, PA 0.008 2.712 0.020 0.008 0.026 1.176 0.027 26.566
Cameron, PA Philadelphia, PA 0.031 2.456 -0.073 -0.025 0.033 0.650 -0.008 -7.263
Contra Costa, CA Alameda, CA 0.010 3.069 -0.029 -0.008 0.051 0.916 0.041 54.512
San Mateo, CA Alameda, CA 0.020 1.054 0.019 0.009 0.197 0.434 0.081 165.503
Santa Clara, CA Alameda, CA 0.011 6.730 0.069 0.034 0.074 2.062 0.148 319.458
Stanislaus, CA Alameda, CA 0.014 0.846 0.001 0.001 0.018 1.760 0.030 24.084
San Joaquin, CA Alameda, CA 0.023 0.929 0.014 0.004 0.007 3.519 0.018 14.146
Arlington, VA District of Col. 0.019 1.940 0.037 0.021 0.025 0.815 0.011 16.524
Montgomery, PA District of Col. 0.005 3.135 0.001 0.000 0.022 1.313 0.015 18.460
Pr. George’s, MD District of Col. 0.011 2.407 -0.021 -0.005 0.011 2.030 -0.011 -10.491
Average 0.018 2.366 0.001 0.001 0.027 1.633 0.017 25.158
Note: The tables shows the effects on neighbors of treated counties. Columns (1) to (4) show the results for employment and columns
(5) to (8) show the results for wages. Columns (1) and (5) display the prereform RMSPE as in Equation (3). Columns (2) and (6) display
the RMSPE Ratio (RMSPE post/RMSPE pre). Finally, columns (3) and (7), and (4) and (8) show the PTE and LTE as in Equations (4)
and (5). Source: QCEW (Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), 2018), own calculation and illustration.
Table A6: States for Synthetic Control Group—Employment
Connecticut California Massachusetts Oregon
Michigan 0.000 0.513 0.000 0.38
Minnesota 0.000 0.000 0.867 0.000
New York 0.698 0.129 0.000 0.000
Arizona 0.000 0.31 0.000 0.000
Wisconsin 0.261 0.000 0.000 0.000
Utah 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.234
Washington 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.161
Nevada 0.000 0.000 0.133 0.000
Wyoming 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.094
Idaho 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.076
South Carolina 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.055
Georgia 0.000 0.048 0.000 0.000
Rhode Island 0.029 0.000 0.000 0.000
Iowa 0.012 0.000 0.000 0.000
Note: The table shows the vector of weights W that minimizes the RMSPE (see Equation
[2[) for all treated states and log employment rate as dependent variable. These weights
are used to construct the synthetic control states in Figure 7. The weights are also used
to calculate the indicators in Table 4. ’0’ indicates that the state is a potential donor state
but has not actually been used as a donor. All states with positive fractions indicate the
donor share employed by the SCGM for the treatment state in the column header. All
fractions in each column add to 100%. Source: QCEW (Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS),
2018), own calculation and illustration.
Table A7: States for Synthetic Control Group—Weekly Wages
Connecticut California Massachusetts Oregon
Michigan 0.38 0.38 0.272 0.000
Utah 0.234 0.234 0.334 0.213
Washington 0.161 0.161 0.169 0.33
Wyoming 0.094 0.094 0.027 0.035
Indiana 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.21
Florida 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.161
Idaho 0.076 0.076 0.003 0.000
South Carolina 0.055 0.055 0.032 0.000
Iowa 0.000 0.000 0.08 0.000
Maine 0.000 0.000 0.065 0.000
Montana 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.051
Colorado 0.000 0.000 0.018 0.000
Note: The table shows the vector of weights W that minimizes the RMSPE (see Equation
(2)) for all treated states and log wages as dependent variable. These weights are used to
construct the synthetic control states in Figure 8. The weights are also used to calculate
the indicators in Table 5. ’0’ indicates that the state is a potential donor state but has not
actually been used as a donor. All states with positive fractions indicate the donor share
employed by the SCGM for the treatment state in the column header. All fractions in
each column add to 100%. Source: QCEW (Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), 2018), own
calculation and illustration.
Table A8: Test for Spillover Effects on Exempt Small Firms in Treated States
State Y¯1i,pre RMSPE pre RMSPE post RMSPE Ratio PTE LTE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. Employment
Connecticut 0.148 0.007 0.029 4.011 0.028 0.001
Massachusetts 0.065 0.007 0.026 3.703 0.024 0.001
Oregon 0.070 0.009 0.031 3.395 0.029 0.001
B. Wages
Connecticut 1002 0.101 0.050 0.492 0.045 19.304
Massachusetts 862 0.016 0.025 1.599 -0.019 13.117
Oregon 686 0.014 0.016 1.078 0.016 1.146
Note: The tables tests the impact of the mandates on exempt small firms. For Connecticut these are small
businesses in the service sector (<50 employees). For Massachusetts and Oregon, these are small businesses
with less than 10 employees. Column (1) displays the outcome in levels for each treated state averaged over
all prereform years. Columns (2) and (3) display the RMSPE as in Equation (3) for pre and postreform years.
Column (4) displays the RMSPE Ratio (RMSPE post/RMSPE pre). Column (5) and (6) show the PTE and LTE
as in Equations (4) and (5). For more information about the sick pay reforms, see Table 1. Source: QCEW
(Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), 2018), own calculation and illustration.
